Hazing as a Manifestation of Evolved Psychology

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology

by

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June 2013
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Hazing, newcomers, initiations, sodalities, coalitional psychology

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ABSTRACT

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Hazing is the abuse of new or prospective group members. What motivates individual hazing behavior? Why does hazing take particular but reliable forms in some organizations? Using experimental, ethnographic, and archival research methods, this dissertation explores general motivational predictors of hazing behavior as well as specific manifestations of hazing in college social fraternities. Results suggest (1) consistent predictors of hazing that may reflect adaptive problems within human ancestral environments, and (2) context-specific manifestations of hazing that may represent a variety of cognitive processes and social negotiations. Findings are discussed in light of hazing’s abiding need for systematic research and hypothesis testing.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Hazing is the abuse of new or prospective group members. Hazing has numerous, partially overlapping definitions (e.g., Ellsworth, 2004), but is treated in this dissertation as induction costs that do not appear to be group-relevant assessments or preparations (see Chapter 2). As a human practice, hazing appears to have a deep cross-cultural antiquity; it has been documented in numerous small-scale and state level societies (e.g., Allan & Madden, 2008; Barry & Schlegel, 1980; Herdt, 1998). Hazing methods are diverse and include humiliation, intimidation, scarification, beating, servile labor, and many others. In part because hazing often represents the ritualized abuse of future allies (i.e., new or prospective group members), it has attracted enduring attention in the social sciences (see Chapter 2).

Claims about the causes and effects of hazing, however, remain poorly tested (Cimino, 2011). Moreover, despite a lack of systematic evidence undergirding common claims about the causes of hazing, their invocation and seeming acceptance is widespread in the social sciences. Here, for instance, are Moreland and Levine (2002), experts on group socialization, commenting on the functions of severe initiations:

A familiar example involves initiations imposed on new members. Initiations can have many purposes, such as building commitment to the group (via dissonance reduction—see Aronson & Mills, 1959), teaching newcomers to depend on and obey full members, allowing full members who had similar initiations to seek their ‘revenge’, strengthening the group’s cohesion, and managing the group’s image among outsiders. But in terms of trust, an important purpose of initiations is testing how committed newcomers are to the group. Thus, full group members view newcomers who refuse to participate in initiations, or who cannot complete their initiations successfully, as untrustworthy, whereas those who fulfill all the requirements of their initiations are perceived as trustworthy. Evidence consistent with this
claim that the harshest initiations occur in groups, such as military units, coal mining crews, and high steel ironworkers, that operate in dangerous environments\(^1\) (see Guimond, 1995; Haas, 1977; Vaught & Smith, 1980). (p. 191)

Note that, for each proposed purpose of severe initiations (e.g., strengthening group cohesion), there is little in the way of citations that build a general, systematic case that hazing achieves or attempts any of its purported goals. The above claims about hazing \textit{might} be true, but what is commonly claimed to be true of hazing is dramatically different than what is well-supported empirically. As it turns out, the measurement of motivational predictors of hazing is practically non-existent, and the measurement of the effects of hazing is both limited and ambiguous. This makes hazing an interesting social phenomenon, one that is frequently and puzzlingly treated as though it were either well-understood or in need of minimal investigation.

The purpose of this dissertation is to lay out additional, systematic evidence pertaining to the ultimate and proximate causes of hazing. The approach is twofold:

1. Bottom-up: Starting with evolved motivations

Did human ancestral environments have adaptive problems that selected for motivations to engage in some aspects of hazing? To what extent do these hypothesized motivations predict the broad regularities observed in hazing and individual predictors of hazing?

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\(^1\) Moreland and Levine’s claim that hazing is harshest in groups that operate in dangerous environments deserves qualification. Exceptionally harsh and lengthy hazing ordeals, including beating, branding, poisoning, sexual humiliation, etc. have been well-documented in college social fraternities. In many cases, these hazings appear just as harsh (if not more so) than those in groups operating in dangerous environments. See, for example, Chapter 4.
2. Top-down: Starting with particular manifestations of hazing

What are the particular manifestations of hazing in a given organization type (e.g., college fraternities)? To what extent might these particular manifestations reflect shared intuitions that are made salient by a specific social and organizational environment?

Both approaches involve evolved psychology, insofar as they necessitate thinking about pan-human characteristics of cognition (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). The second approach, however, is not a direct attempt to discover a “lock and key” association between adaptive problem and adaptation. It is a search for context-specific explanations of hazing ordeals in particular environments, with the understanding that the manifest character of hazing in any given instance will reflect numerous causal processes, some of which may be divorced from any putative hazing mechanisms.

The bottom-up approach will be explored in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, both of which are initial experimental attempts to manipulate and measure hazing motivation. These studies appear to be the first experiments that target hazing motivation. Thus, while preliminary, they mark the beginning of a research program to unpack the motivational processes that lead to the systematic abuse of newcomers.

The top-down approach will be explored in Chapter 4, which builds on months of observational field work at a college social fraternity. The objective of Chapter 4 is to examine and establish the existence of a keystone feature of fraternity inductions (planned failure) through on-site observation, interviews, and archival accounts of fraternity hazing throughout the United States. Chapter 4 contributes to
building a generalized account of college fraternity hazing and investigates a number of principled reasons why fraternity hazing may include planned failure.

Finally, Chapter 5 will summarize progress made and lay out additional directions for a more comprehensive science of hazing.
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Ellsworth, Chad Williams. (2004). Definitions of hazing: Differences among selected student organizations. (MA), University of Maryland, College Park.


Chapter 2

The Evolution of Hazing

Chapter 2 describes the common themes and enduring ideas that are typically used to explain hazing. These ideas are not obviously or necessarily wrong, but they often lack specificity and take important aspects of hazing for granted. For example, why are hazing ordeals unidirectional? Why are they coercive? Why is the dominance created during hazing not simply preserved into normal membership? Chapter 2 sketches an initial, non-comprehensive theory of hazing (automatic accrual theory) that may help explain some of hazing's regularities and motivational predictors. Chapter 2 was originally published in the Journal of Cognition and Culture. This version incorporates corrigenda, minor clarifications, and a supplemental analysis section.
Hazing is the abuse of new or prospective group members (collectively, “newcomers”). Hazing and initiations have fascinated social scientists for at least a century (e.g., Barth, 1975; Eliade, 1958; Gennep, 1909; Herdt, 1998; Loeb, 1929; Miller, 1932; Muuss, 1970; Schlegel & Barry, 1979; Tiger, 1984; Webster, 1908). The startling variety of ordeals and privations suffered by hazees includes physical assaults, scarification, sleep deprivation, servile labor, and many others. Hazing is common throughout much of the world, including modern, industrialized countries (e.g., Allan & Madden, 2008; Butt-Thompson, 1908; Gershel, Katz-Sidlow, Eric, & Stephanie, 2003; Hoover, 1999; Hoover & Pollard, 2000; Jeong, 2003; Lewis, 1992; Linhares de Albuquerque & Paes-Machado, 2004; McCarl, 1976; Parks & Brown, 2005; Schlegel & Barry, 1979; Shaw, 1992). Time and again, new coalitions\(^1\) form, persist for some time, and then invent or adopt hazing practices.

But what specific psychological processes cause people to haze? Although some experimental research has examined hazing’s effect on hazees (e.g., Aronson & Mills, 1959; Enge, 1993; Schopler & Bateson, 1962), there are no experimental studies that investigate hazing motivation at the individual level. This paper attempts to fill this gap by exploring the possible role of evolved motivational systems in generating and sustaining hazing behavior. To do so, I will first provide a provisional definition of hazing and review the major theoretical claims made about hazing behavior. Second, I will examine two foundational theories of hazing from an explicitly evolutionary perspective, comparing real-world observations of hazing.

\(^1\) By “coalition” I have in mind relatively cohesive groups such as secret societies, fraternal and sororal associations, society-wide associations of males, etc. (cf. Bates & Babchuk, 1961; Tooby et al., 2006).
behavior to the core predictions of these theories. Finally, I will attempt to extend the logic of these theories and report on two experimental studies of a cognitive, motivational theory of hazing.

A Provisional Definition of Hazing

The present analysis assumes that hazing is logically—and psychologically—separable from initiations and ritual in general. For instance, some groups haze outside of formalized initiations and many initiations occur without hazing (e.g., Lewis, 1992; Nuwer, 2000; Schlegel & Barry, 1979). Hazing is defined here as the generation of induction costs (i.e., part of the experiences necessary to be acknowledged as a “legitimate” group member) that appear unattributable to group-relevant assessments, preparations, or chance. For example, the energetic cost of running while trying out for a men’s track team is a product of a group-relevant assessment. If the track team were to mandate that prospective members dress in women’s clothing for the same activity, any additional costs (energetic or social) do not appear relevant to the group’s task domain. Logically, hazing may also be manifest in unduly excessive assessments or preparations. Thus, “group relevance” encompasses both the content and the intensity of an induction experience. By this definition, hazing is not simply the sum of a group’s unpleasant induction activities. To illustrate, imagine a club whose sole purpose is to hold cinder blocks for five hours a day. If this club (“The Block Holders”) asks the same of prospective members, they are asking for the performance of a group-relevant task, presumably to assess whether candidate members are capable of holding heavy cinder blocks. Such a requirement is legitimately unpleasant, but it closely reflects what the group does on
a regular basis. Conversely, if the block-holding requirement is transplanted to a reading club, its purpose becomes much less transparent. This definition renders some classic examples of hazing questionable—basic training in the military may be profoundly unpleasant, but much of it is likely understandable in non-hazing terms. This provisional definition is not an ontological claim. Even the most bizarre hazing behaviors may turn out to be explicable in terms of group-relevant assessments or preparations (e.g., Keating et al., 2005). However, testing whether this is the case requires a definition that distinguishes hazing from other aspects of group inductions. This definition makes explicit the aspect of costly inductions that has likely held the attention of generations of social scientists.

The Theoretical Landscape of Hazing

Unfortunately, much of the literature that is pertinent to the study of hazing does not concern “hazing” in the precise sense defined in this paper (e.g., Hoover, 1999; Nuwer, 2000; Van Raalte, Cornelius, Linder, & Brewer, 2007). Further, many researchers have theorized about phenomena that may include a non-trivial hazing component (such as adolescent initiations), but have not designed their theories to explain hazing itself or hazing outside of certain populations (e.g., Cohen, 1964; Granzberg, 1972; Grimes, 2000; Sosis, Kress, & Boster, 2007; Young, 1965, but see Cialdini, 2001; Keating et al., 2005). Consequently, many of the theories that are relevant to hazing operate at different levels of analysis and are not strictly comparable. Nonetheless, there are three persistent themes in the explanations given

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2 This is not to imply that hazing is absent from military organizations. See discussions in Dornbusch (1955), Winslow (1999), Ostvik and Rudmin (2001), and Pershing (2006).
(or implied) for hazing, even in widely different contexts. It is these three themes—these “macro theories”—that I will use to organize the literature. By macro theory, I mean an umbrella theory that encompasses the many possible mediators of some contributor to hazing’s genesis or persistence. Simply stated, these theories are (a) hazing generates group solidarity; (b) hazing is an expression of dominance; and (c) hazing allows for the selection of committed group members. Because most explanations of hazing are recapitulations of these core ideas, there is an implied consensus in the social sciences that one or more of the macro theories is true. While the macro theories do not exhaust the actual or possible theories of hazing, they are the most common and most generalizable frameworks (For other applicable theories, see Bettelheim, 1954; McCauley & Lawson, 2002; Whitehouse, 2004; Wilson, 2008).

Consider, first, the solidarity macro theory. One of the most well-known implementations of the solidarity macro theory uses social psychology’s concept of cognitive dissonance (for a recent review of cognitive dissonance, see Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007). Originally outlined by Aronson and Mills (1959), the basic hypothesis is that individuals who undergo hazing justify their high levels of effort by

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3 I emphasize that few of the researchers cited are constructing “hazing theories” in an explicit and purposeful sense. I mean only that their writings suggest or imply the existence of a causal process underlying the abuse of new or prospective members in one or more contexts.

4 There is a broad sense in which many hypothesized effects of hazing may contribute to some definition of “group solidarity” (e.g., selecting for committed members may help the group function better). Thus, the macro theory of solidarity is that hazing increases group cohesion (i.e., efficiency, effectiveness, or social harmony) by some means that is not logically dependent on the macro theories of commitment or dominance.
increasing their liking for the hazing group. Note, however, that cognitive dissonance is simply a candidate mediator of the solidarity macro theory—it is a possible way for hazing to increase hazees’ valuation of the group. Similarly, Keating et al. (2005) have argued that the over-arching purpose of hazing is to create “dependence,” whereby abused individuals increase their liking of their abusers (as in Stockholm Syndrome). Again, this is a hypothesized way for hazing to generate an increase in intragroup valuation (see also Schopler & Bateson, 1962; Tuzin, 1980). These social-psychological theories represent just a few instantiations of the solidarity macro theory. Innumerable others throughout the social sciences have suggested or implied that hazing contributes to group solidarity in one context or another (e.g., Alcorta & Sosis, 2005; Anderson & Noesjirwan, 1980; Aronson, 1988; Bloch & Niederhoffer, 1958; Cohen, 1964; Decker & Van Winkle, 1996; Johnson, 2000; Miller, 1932; Parks & Brown, 2005; Rooyen, Potgieter, & Mtezuka, 2006; Smith, 1964; Tiger, 1984; Turner, 1967; Vigil, 1996; Walker, 1968; Webster, 1908; Weisfeld, 1997; Whiting, Kluckhohn, & Anthony, 1958; Wiessner, Tumu, & Pupu, 1998; Winslow, 1999; Wintrup, 2004; Young, 1965).

In apparent contrast to the solidarity macro theory is the dominance macro theory. The idea that hazers are seeking to establish or reaffirm a dominant position with respect to hazees is very common. Consider a few examples: Durkheim (1912) notes that group members haze newcomers to “make them understand how superior [they feel]” (p. 318). Bryshun (1998) writes that athletic hazing allows veterans to have their dominant position “consolidated” (p. 100). Whiting (1958) argues that hazing in male adolescent initiations is used to suppress “open and violent revolt” (p.
Honeycutt (2005) describes veterans of a discussion group hazing to “maintain their power” (analysis section, final paragraph). Robidoux (2001) describes athletic hazers “celebrating their power over the rookies” (p. 104). Keating et al. (2005) suggest that vertically-organized groups use severe initiations to “[establish] social control” (p. 107). Waldron and Kowalski write that athletic hazing rituals help “maintain the…power structure of the team” (p. 292). Nuwer (2000) actually defines hazing as an imposition of dominance, stating that hazing involves any “activity that requires new members to show subservience to older members” (p. 21), and so on (e.g., Allan & DeAngelis, 2004; Johnson, 2001; Stone, 1946; Tooby, Cosmides, & Price, 2006; Webster, 1908). The dominance macro theory is clearly a response to the manifest content of hazing, that is, the humiliating nature of many hazing practices and the humble, passive behavior expected of hazees.

Finally, the commitment macro theory is also well represented. Vigil (1996) writes that severe gang initiations act to “weed out the weak and uncommitted” (p. 151). Smith (1964) suggests that lengthy fraternity inductions are “contrived for the pledging of commitment” (p. 29). Johnson (2000) writes of athletic hazees having to “prove their commitment” (p. 70). Iannaccone (1992) argues that painful initiations “screen out free riders” (p. 11). Moreland and Levine (2002) describe harsh initiations as “testing how committed newcomers are” (p. 191). Tiger (1984) theorizes that male hazing is “analogous to mate selection in the reproductive sphere” (p. 135). Jones (2004) suggests that the pledges of fraternities are hazed to “prove their worth” (p. 59), and so on (e.g., Aronson & Mills, 1959; Boyer, 2001; Bryshun, 1998; Paige & Paige, 1981; Sosis et al., 2007). If one considers non-coerced, costly inductions in a
market of prospective members, there is a minimal sense in which some of the social processes required by the commitment macro theory are likely true in practice, even if not in purpose. That is, all else held equal, groups with costly inductions will be more discouraging to uncommitted inductees.

The preceding description of the macro theories has been rendered in very broad terms to account for the variation in mechanisms and levels of analysis. Of note, most of the cited researchers implicitly support more than one macro theory. Each quote identifies just one aspect of a given researcher’s approach to hazing or hazing-inclusive practices. Such theoretical complexity is understandable—hazing is a multifaceted phenomenon that almost certainly lacks a single, causal explanation. Nonetheless, making progress on understanding hazing may require starting with simpler, less inclusive theories. Such theories can focus on identifying experimentally tractable—and hopefully dissociable—components of hazing. Ideally, these smaller theories can be combined to generate a more complete and comprehensible picture of the phenomenon. This paper focuses on analyzing hazing in light of two of the macro theories: commitment and dominance (I leave an exploration of the solidarity macro theory to future work). To do so, I will formulate simple, testable versions of the commitment and dominance macro theories and attempt to match their predictions with extant naturalistic data on hazing behavior. I will then isolate predictions made by both theories that fall short of available evidence, propose a contributory theory, and test its basic predictions with two laboratory experiments. However, generating coherent, testable versions of the commitment and dominance macro theories requires
a plausible description of the general psychology that might underlie hazing motivation. In other words, what kind of mind hazes?

**Hazing and the Nature of Intergenerational Coalitions**

By definition, hazing is a phenomenon that occurs around the time that new members are integrated into an extant coalition. Thus, how the mind understands “newcomers” may be crucial to explaining why hazing occurs. Consider the process that generates significant differences in tenure length between members: staggered group entry over time. This process produces multiple overlapping membership generations. Staggered group entry is not a logical necessity – one can at least imagine a world in which all enduring coalitions consist solely of their founding members. Thus, the recurrent practice of newcomer integration suggests the practice has (or had in our evolutionary past) at least some value. Newcomers may contribute a host of benefits, including additional labor inputs, unique skills, social connections outside the group, etc. (e.g., Cimino & Delton, 2010; Cini, Moreland, & Levine, 1993). That said, the benefits associated with newcomers are potentially offset by their costs. Newcomers increase coordination problems simply by increasing the size of the group and may be habitual free riders. That is, they may take the benefits associated with being a coalition member without paying the costs of maintaining these benefits in the future (e.g., Cini et al., 1993; Delton & Cimino, 2010; Iannaccone, 1992; Smith, 1964; Sosis et al., 2007; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). Solving the problems posed by free riders is considered critical to the evolution of cooperation in humans (see discussion in Price, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2002). Note that the existence of intergenerational coalitions and the associated costs and benefits of
newcomers are not simply artifacts of modern environments. At a basic level, these features of social life have likely persisted throughout much of human evolution. Consistent with this assumption, around the world, coalition newcomers appear to have a kind of visual and conceptual salience. They are often carefully attended to, pushed through rituals, oddly celebrated or punished, made to wear distinctive attire, given epithets (e.g., “greenhorn,” “F.N.G.” Bey, 1972; Carus, 1909). The common recurrence of these cultural forms may reflect an evolved ambivalence towards newcomers. Indeed, because the regular induction of newcomers likely played a role in the relative success of coalitions, humans may have an evolved concept of newcomer – a series of cognitive subroutines that generate adaptive responses to new coalition members. For example, experiments from Cimino and Delton (2010) suggest that subjects implicitly categorize coalition members by tenure (including newcomers) and ascribe especially low levels of trustworthiness and entitlement to newcomers, even when deprived of all characterological information. If there is psychological design geared towards newcomers and group integration in general, might there be psychological design “for” hazing? While it is unlikely that there is any single-purpose, dedicated hazing adaptation, certain aspects of hazing motivation may be part of the proper domain of cognitive mechanisms designed for coalitional psychology (cf. Sosis et al., 2007; Tooby et al., 2006). That is, some of the mechanisms designed to solve adaptive problems associated with newcomers may license inferences and generate motivational states designed to prompt at least some of what is called “hazing.” Given that trust and commitment appear central to the
adaptive problems generated by newcomers, the commitment macro theory represents a logical starting place in generating a theory of hazing motivation\(^5\).

**A Basic Commitment Theory of Hazing**

Humans are designed to attend to cues that suggest how others value them and store these inferred magnitudes as cognitive variables (Tooby, Cosmides, Sell, Lieberman, & Sznycer, 2008). One such variable is intrinsic valuation: the willingness of a given agent to make unmonitored decisions that favor the self or allies. When an individual represents a conspecific’s level of intrinsic valuation with a high degree of uncertainty, this may trigger motivational states that increase monitoring of cues to valuation and, in some circumstances, manufacture situations that hasten the receipt of such information. Members of enduring coalitions repeatedly encounter agents whose intrinsic valuation of their group is subject to a high degree of uncertainty—newcomers (e.g., Cimino & Delton, 2010; Delton & Cimino, 2010; Moreland & Levine, 2002; Sosis & Alcorta, 2003; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). Evidence indicates that new coalition members are selected at least partly on their perceived commitment to the group and that coalitions with cooperative interdependence place an even greater value on the commitment of prospective members (e.g., Cini et al., 1993; Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007; Stiff & Van Vugt, 2008). As discussed above, selecting committed members is important, as

\(^5\) It is important to differentiate between the commitment macro theory (a term meant to encompass hazing as a means of selecting committed members) and the costly signaling theory of ritual. Researchers using the latter theory sometimes invoke multiple macro theories in describing and explaining hazing-inclusive phenomena (e.g., Alcorta & Sosis, 2005; Bulbulia, 2008; Sosis et al., 2007). As such, the commitment macro theory represents a comparatively restricted set of ideas.
individuals with very low levels of intrinsic valuation may habitually free ride or defec
t during collective actions. Note that, in the abstract, any non-trivial hazing accepted by new or prospective members may serve as a cue of their intrinsic valuation of the coalition (e.g., Boyer, 2001; Iannaccone, 1992; Moreland & Levine, 2002; Sosis et al., 2007). Indeed, hazing often involves enduring some ordeal that has little direct benefit for the hazer (e.g., eating nauseating substances, tolerating sleep deprivation, performing exhausting calisthenics). Participation in these activities may indicate that a new or prospective member is willing to endure high costs to impart even small benefits. Hazing, then, is at least theoretically efficient at hastening the receipt of information about intrinsic valuation. What predictions does this basic theory make about the structure of hazing behavior in the real world? One prediction is that hazing should be conducted in a way that does not divorce the actions of hazees from their intrinsic valuation of the coalition. Thus, during hazing ordeals, hazees should not be coerced, deceived, or confused in ways that would lessen the cue value of their participation (e.g., intimidating hazees to induce compliance). This basic prediction is strongly disconfirmed by real-world hazing, which is rife with all of these information-limiting characteristics (e.g., Anderson & Noesjirwan, 1980; Baier & Williams, 1983; Bryshun, 1998; Colton, 1993; Herdt, 1998; Houseman, 2001; Hunter, 1996; Jeong, 2003; Johnson, 2001; Whitehouse, 1996; Whiting et al., 1958).

In my own field work with a pseudonymous college fraternity (“Alpha”), I have continually witnessed veteran members surround prospective members and begin yelling for a hazing ordeal to be completed. Being surrounded by a group of
angry, screaming men is generally motivating for reasons separable from one’s intrinsic valuation. These occurrences are not occasional responses to reluctance—they are part of a systematic effort to intimidate and confuse hazees. To be clear, the issue is not that coercive hazing is incapable of providing any information about intrinsic valuation. In the specific case of college fraternities, multiple hazing events are spread out over a number of weeks. Because fraternities are voluntary associations, the time between events allows prospective members to withdraw from the group entirely. Continued participation, by contrast, implies some level of commitment. But this line of reasoning still leaves the coercion within hazing events completely unexplained. That is, if hazing exists to generate accurate inferences of intrinsic valuation, why should it ever be coerced? Presumably, what a prospective member will assent to while surrounded and monitored by the entire coalition (as well as exhausted, sleep deprived, nauseated, etc.) is an inaccurate measure of what said member will assent to while uncompromised and unmonitored.

Additionally, it is noteworthy that hazing occurs in non-voluntary associations. Many small-scale societies have men’s associations or cults with obligatory inductions for all males (e.g., Precourt, 1975; Webster, 1908). Because participation is obligatory, the mere presence of an inductee is arguably a less reliable cue of intrinsic valuation than the mere presence of a fraternity pledge. And yet these obligatory hazings show many of the same anomalous characteristics seen in fraternity hazing (e.g., induced fatigue, coercion). Thus, the question remains: Why is hazing executed in ways that make inferring intrinsic valuation more difficult?
From the perspective of the basic commitment theory, another oddity of hazing is that it is almost entirely unidirectional: Veterans inflict hazing on newcomers, but newcomers do not inflict hazing on veterans. Rather than taking this regularity as a given, it should be regarded as a puzzle. After all, newcomers face some of the same informational uncertainties as veterans: Newcomers do not know whether veterans will defect or free ride on their own labor. Logically, veterans could first (non-coercively) haze newcomers and then allow themselves to be (non-coercively) hazed by these same newcomers. Doing so would allow for the exchange of mutual, high-value cues of intrinsic valuation. As an example of what such behavior might look like, consider Walker (1968). Walker examined fraternity hazing practices at the University of Washington, requiring that he gain the trust of multiple informants from different fraternities. One method of gaining their confidence was “trading hacks”. To trade a hack is to willfully allow one’s self to be paddled on the buttocks and to then reciprocate in kind. Trading hacks is a painful experience that (according to Walker) is designed to express mutual trust. It contains role reversal as well as a traditional instrument of fraternity hazing (the paddle). And yet a careful reading of Walker (1968) suggests that trading hacks is either uncommon or absent in

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6 The claim being made is not that mutual hazing never occurs, but rather that it does not represent how hazing is typically conducted. Even apparent examples of mutual hazing can be misleading. For instance, “reverse hazing” events have been documented in college fraternities, where prospective members are tasked with performing a one-time prank on veterans. Notably, these events are short-lived and trivial compared to the hazing received by the prospective members. Further, some reverse hazing events appear as though they were designed to provide a justification for punishment by veterans (e.g., Leemon, 1970; Walker, 1968).
the hazing processes he documented. Instead, it appears to be a practice that exists among current fraternity members. Note that trading hacks is an example of what most real-world hazing could look like, but somehow does not. Further, it is a demonstration that hazers may understand (implicitly) the logic of mutual, non-coercive hazing, which prompts questions as to why it is not the predominant form of hazing.

In summary, certain characteristics of hazing appear to allow for the selection of members with high levels of intrinsic valuation. Specifically, in a market of prospective members, a high-cost induction will presumably discourage those who desire only short-term association (and, thus, short-term benefits). That said, there are other characteristics of hazing (e.g., coercion), as well as hazing’s presence in non-voluntary associations, that suggest that generating accurate inferences of intrinsic valuation is not the only function of hazing and may not be its primary function.

A Basic Dominance Theory of Hazing

The above discussion of coercion and unidirectionality in hazing naturally prompts questions about the role of dominance in hazing. As explained in the discussion of the macro theories, hazing is sometimes characterized as an attempt to establish or reaffirm dominance over newcomers. Here, I assume that individuals who are dominant over others have differential access to valued resources by virtue of their ability to inflict costs (physical or social) on less dominant individuals (e.g., Ermer, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2008). Thus, one might conceive of hazing as a kind of aggressive dominance display or contest, where veterans are the inevitable winners. Are there any problems with this account of hazing? For one, hazing often occurs
within an organized ceremonial or ritualistic context. These contexts can implicitly or explicitly communicate that the activities therein are separate and distinct from everyday life (e.g., Boyer, 2001). This is important, as it makes little sense for hazers to introduce doubt as to whether hazing reflects the dominance hierarchy once the hazing process is complete. From the perspective of the basic dominance theory, hazing should be a real-world attack or display, with little to no ambiguity as to its meaning. Within my own field work, this is not how hazing is framed by hazers. For instance, veterans of Alpha will commonly say to hazees that hazing is “just business.” By this they mean, “when I haze you, it is not personal.” They say this to reduce the perception that hazees are facing a direct physical contest. If hazing were a straightforward dominance display, one might expect them to say something akin to, “when I haze you, you should never forget it.” To be clear, members of Alpha always attempt to be scary and intimidating to prospective members, but they also attempt to qualify their hazing in ways that suggest that the hazing process is different from everyday life. While Alpha is only one group, hazer/hazee relationships in other groups appear to contain implicit mutual knowledge that their interactions do not reflect the normal social order (e.g., Houseman, 2001; Turner, 1967). That is, it is understood that hazers can order hazees around, make ridiculous demands and inflict high costs, but at a certain point, they must cease doing so.

Even if hazing is set apart from the normal social order, perhaps it still communicates an implicit difference in dominance. After all, establishing dominance may not require explicit communication or regular reinforcement, only a credible demonstration of relative formidability. However, the basic dominance theory
predicts that the result of this demonstration will be evident post hazing. Post-hazing newcomers should show an appropriate level of deference to veterans, with veterans reacting punitively otherwise. “Appropriate” levels of deference are difficult to test because even newcomers to non-hazing coalitions have less status than veterans (e.g., Cimino & Delton, 2010; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). As such, it is not a confirmation of the basic dominance theory to find that post-hazing newcomers are not the equals of veterans.

More importantly, there is a regularity of hazing that appears inconsistent with the idea that hazing is a one-time dominance display: Hazees always increase in status once they have completed their hazing process. That is, once hazing is done, newcomers are no longer required to perform the ordeals or servile labor associated with their status as hazees, and they typically gain additional access to coalition benefits (e.g., prestige, property). This is important, as there is no necessity for veterans to cede any of the dominance that they have (by this theory) worked to create. In the case of Alpha, individuals who have completed the hazing process can no longer be made to clean the fraternity house on command, perform personal favors for veterans, greet veterans with submissive gestures (e.g., head down, no eye contact), etc. Veterans will even joke with post-hazing newcomers about their past dictatorial relationship, with both parties laughing (A paraphrased example: Veteran: “Hey, bring me my dinner!” Newcomer: “Nah.”). Events such as these clearly communicate that the status of newcomers has risen post-hazing, making any dominance evident during hazing profoundly exaggerated relative to the actual social hierarchy. While not all hazing coalitions have such casual, egalitarian relations
between newcomers and veterans, it seems inescapable that the end of hazing means a relaxation of their relative difference in status.

In summary, certain hazing behaviors (e.g., intimidation) look like dominance displays, while certain behaviors demanded of hazees look like cues of submission (e.g., lowered eyes). As such, some hazing experiences may leave lasting impressions on newcomers that influence their willingness to cede resources to veterans post hazing (e.g., Keating et al., 2005). That said, other characteristics of hazing appear anomalous from the perspective of the basic dominance theory. The mutually acknowledged “separateness” of the hazing period suggests that, in the least, it is not a normal dominance display. Further, the shared understanding that hazing will end with an increased status for newcomers makes any dominance established by hazing seemingly temporary.

**Explaining Some of Hazing’s Anomalous Characteristics: Automatic Accrual Theory**

I have identified some characteristics of real-world hazing that seem anomalous in light of two basic implementations of the commitment and dominance macro theories. Essentially, hazing practices appear coercive, unidirectional (i.e., focused on newcomers), temporary, and not an accurate representation of the coalition’s dominance hierarchy post hazing. One possibility is that these anomalous characteristics are a product of one or more functions of evolved hazing motivation that are not described by the basic commitment or dominance theories. How might one explain these characteristics? I have suggested that humans have an evolved concept of newcomer. This concept instantiates a set of adaptive responses to new
coalition members, among them anti-exploitation responses (e.g., an initial reduction of trust and entitlement). These responses may function, in part, to prevent newcomers from successfully free riding on coalition benefits. Ancestrally, however, it was not simply the existence of generalized “group benefits” that allowed coalitions to be exploited by newcomers. It was specifically those benefits freely consumable upon group entry—automatic benefits—that were most at risk of exploitation (e.g., status, group protection, common property). In contrast, benefits with a slow or costly accrual period—non-automatic benefits—were at little risk of exploitation (e.g., knowledge of difficult, specialized skills).

Ancestral exploitation by newcomers may have taken at least two forms. First, newcomers might join a coalition and contribute nothing, accruing automatic benefits until successfully excluded (cf. Ehrhart & Kesser, 1999). Second, newcomers might simply increase free riding behaviors around the time of group entry, but reduce or cease this strategy as their tenure increases. Why might the second strategy be profitable? In the real world, judgments of whether an individual is free riding are made relative to that individual’s task-specific competence and condition (e.g., Delton, Cosmides, Guemo, Robertson, & Tooby, 2012). For example, in a collective action where all participants are expected to construct baskets, there may exist natural variance in basket-constructing competence, due to differences in age, physical condition, and practiced skill. An individual who is understood to be legitimately

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Most (if not all) of these benefits qualify as club goods or common-pool resources for the coalition in question. My use of the term “automatic benefits” is simply to group them together and highlight their likelihood of low-cost consumption by newcomers.
poor at constructing baskets is unlikely to be seen as free riding when producing fewer baskets than others (Gurven, 2006). Being a newcomer to a coalition means that one’s competence and trustworthiness as a coalition member are known with less accuracy. This informational uncertainty will make real-world free riding more difficult to detect. Ancestrally, if free riding around the time of coalition entry was more difficult to detect and if there were large benefits available for members who contributed nothing (i.e., high automatic benefits), free riding might have been more common among newcomers of enduring coalitions. As such, anti-free riding mechanisms may have been designed to motivate increasing the costs (and reducing the automatic benefits) for low-tenure members (cf. Honeycutt, 2005; Sosis et al., 2007; Tooby et al., 2006). This would presumably reduce the payoffs associated with near-term free riding. Additionally, establishing a level of dominance and control during a period of otherwise heightened exploitation would allow for veterans to guarantee at least some labor inputs and demonstrate a temporarily increased willingness to inflict costs for social violations (for examples of enforced labor in hazing, see Baier & Williams, 1983; Gordon, Hall, & Blankenship, 1979; Shaw, 1992; Svaan, 1967; Webster, 1908).

Because the above theory focuses on automatic group benefits, I will refer to it as “automatic accrual theory.” In this paper, I will test four basic predictions of automatic accrual theory:

1. Because strongly cooperative groups generate high levels of automatic benefits, membership in these groups will motivate greater hazing severity than
membership in weakly cooperative groups (effectively, this difference in hazing severity will be mediated via differences in automatic benefits).

2. If hazing is designed, in part, to prevent the exploitation of automatic benefits, non-automatic benefits will predict no unique variance in hazing severity when automatic benefits are statistically controlled.

3. Because being a high contributor to a group entails disproportionate contribution to the maintenance of automatic benefits, members with high levels of contribution will haze more severely than members with low levels of contribution. Presumably, these members value the coalition more and will be differentially motivated to prevent its exploitation.

4. If hazing is designed, in part, to create costs that prevent or discourage near-term exploitation, hazers should be increasingly willing to coercively inflict these costs as the chance of exploitation increases. In other words, if hazing severity reflects the likelihood of exploitation by newcomers (see prediction 1), it will positively predict hazing coerciveness. These predictions were tested with two vignette-based experiments wherein participants were given an opportunity to indicate their desire to haze newcomers.

   **Experiment 1: Automatic Benefits and Desired Hazing Severity Participants**

   132 participants (44 male) between the ages of 18 and 30 (M = 19.56, SD = 2.06) were recruited from a UC Santa Barbara physical anthropology course (hazing and initiations were not discussed in the course). Course credit was given for participation.

   **Materials and Procedure**
Participants were randomly assigned to complete questionnaires about two strongly cooperative groups (i.e., high levels of cooperative interdependence) or two weakly cooperative groups. Each questionnaire described typical group activities and instructed participants to imagine themselves as current members. Group descriptions also contained pictures of individuals engaged in group-relevant tasks. Within each group type (strongly cooperative vs. weakly cooperative), order of group presentation was counterbalanced. Following each group description, participants read that they were either high group contributors (i.e., they expended high effort in group activities, volunteered to provide additional help when needed, etc.) or low group contributors. The order of contribution primes was counterbalanced. To control for generalized sex differences in aggressiveness, sex was included as a predictor variable. In sum, the study used a 2x2x2 mixed-model design: group type (strongly cooperative vs. weakly cooperative: between) x contribution (high vs. low: within) x participant sex (male = 1, female = 0).

Non-Manipulated Questionnaire Components

Membership in each group was described as contingent on two criteria: (i) the ability to get along with existing members and (ii) the possession of group relevant skills or attributes. Participants read that the group had recently decided to have an initiation for new members. As current members, participants were allowed to shape the initiation. Their options consisted of (a) whether the initiation should have a pleasant component, and if so, how pleasant; (b) whether the initiation should have a stressful component, and if so, how stressful; and (c) whether new members should be pressured to complete the initiation, and if so, to what extent. This was followed
by a series of questions about how the group will benefit new members, including (a) to what extent joining the group will increase the status of new members in the eyes of non-members; (b) to what extent joining the group will provide new members with a coalition that will protect them outside of typical group activities; and (c) to what extent joining the group will increase two different group-relevant skills or traits, rated separately. Questions used five-point rating scales (0-4). See Appendix for complete stimuli.
Groups Used in Vignettes

All groups were fictional and designed to be relatively unfamiliar to participants (i.e., no publicly known hazing status). The following are summaries of the group descriptions provided to participants:

Ice Walkers (strongly cooperative): The Ice Walkers are a group of arctic survival specialists. The Ice Walkers go on expeditions to remote, mountainous locations. While on expeditions, the group must fend for itself and work together to hunt, climb, and carry vital supplies.

Aid Workers (strongly cooperative): The Aid Workers are a group of international Emergency Medical Technicians that operates in war-torn countries. While on assignment, the group is sometimes under fire and must depend on each other to assist in tense medical situations.

Bug Watchers (weakly cooperative): The Bug Watchers are a group of insect enthusiasts. They meet to give presentations on various insect species and organize trips to relevant museums.

Audiophiles (weakly cooperative): The Audiophiles are a group of stereo and audio enthusiasts. They meet to attend relevant conventions and compete to have the best stereo systems.

Operationalization and Composite Variables

“Desired hazing severity” was operationalized as the advocated stressfulness of the initiation. “Automatic benefits” were operationalized as the sum of the status benefit and the protection benefit. “Non-automatic benefits” were operationalized as the sum of the group-relevant skill/trait benefits, which varied by group (for example,
the Ice Walkers’ non-automatic benefits consisted of physical fitness and arctic survival skills).

Results

All significance tests are two-tailed. Effect sizes use Cohen’s $d$. Only significant interactions are reported.

Did Participants Haze More Severely in Strongly Cooperative Groups than in Weakly Cooperative Groups?

Yes; participants desired more severe hazing in strong groups ($M = 2.49$, $SD = 0.93$) than in weak groups ($M = 1.08$, $SD = 0.78$). The effect was large: $d = 1.64$, $F(1,128) = 75.17$, $p < 0.001$.

Did Automatic Benefits Appear to Mediate the Effect of Group Type on Hazing Severity?

Yes; controlling for automatic benefits reduced the amount of variance in desired hazing severity that can be uniquely explained by group type (Figure 1).

Did Non-Automatic Benefits Fail to Mediate the Effect of Group Type on Hazing Severity?

Yes; non-automatic benefits explained no unique variance in desired hazing severity (Figure 1).

Did Participants Haze More Severely as High Contributors than as Low Contributors?

Yes; participants desired more severe hazing as high contributors ($M = 1.96$, $SD = 1.24$) than as low contributors ($M = 1.64$, $SD = 1.2$). The effect was small: $d = 0.26$, $F(1,128) = 9.25$, $p < 0.01$. 


Did Hazing Severity Positively Correlate with Hazing Coerciveness?

Yes; the more severe the desired hazing, the greater the desired pressure, \( r = 0.58, N=132, p < 0.001 (M = 1.61, SD = 1.1). \)

Did Automatic Benefits Explain Unique Variance in Hazing Severity for All Groups?

Partially; all groups evidenced a significant relationship between automatic benefits and desired hazing severity (Table 1), save the Audiophiles \( (p = 0.07). \)

Did Non-Automatic Benefits Fail to Explain Unique Variance in Hazing Severity in All Groups?

Yes; non-automatic benefits explained no unique variance in desired hazing severity in any of the four groups (Table 1).

Discussion

All four basic predictions of automatic accrual theory were supported in Experiment 1. Notably, automatic (but not non-automatic) benefits were unique predictors of desired hazing severity. In addition, desired hazing severity was significantly correlated with desired hazing coerciveness. In Experiment 2, I attempted to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 while improving the stimuli and removing threats to internal validity.

Experiment 2: Replication

Only changes from Experiment 1 are noted. Participants 175 participants (68 male) between the ages of 18 and 58 \( (M = 19.24, SD = 3.28) \) were recruited.

Materials and Procedure Minor changes and clarifications were made to group descriptions, contribution primes, and benefit questions. Because group pictures may
have implied sex ratios, racial makeup and other variables of unknown effect, they were removed. To capture a broader conception of obligatory group assistance, the protection benefit question was changed to ask about the extent to which new members will benefit from “mutual aid” when in any kind of trouble. In an attempt to make the contribution primes more salient, they were modified to add information about cumulative group contribution: high contributors read that they had been with the group for three years; low contributors for four months. For each group, one criterion for membership was modified: Instead of simply possessing group-relevant skills or attributes, participants read that prospective members were required to prove that they possessed the relevant skills necessary to be members prior to group entry. This was done to decrease the chance that differences between group types in “initiation stressfulness” represented differentially stressful tests of group-relevant skills (see the definition of hazing). Finally, in an attempt to capture greater variability in ratings, eleven-point rating scales were used (0-10).

**Results**

**Did Participants Haze More Severely in Strongly Cooperative Groups than in Weakly Cooperative Groups?**

Yes; participants desired more severe hazing in strong groups (M = 6.12, SD = 2.5) than in weak groups (M = 3.9, SD = 2.09). The effect was large: $d = 0.96$, $F(1,171) = 49.10$, $p < 0.001$. Sex interacted with group type: men evidenced a greater difference in desired hazing severity than women. The simple main effect was large for men ($d = 1.57$) and medium for women ($d = 0.62$), $F(1,171) = 8.69$, $p < 0.01$. 
Did Automatic Benefits Appear to Mediate the Effect of Group Type on Hazing Severity?

Yes; controlling for automatic benefits reduced the amount of variance in desired hazing severity that can be uniquely explained by group type (Figure 2).

Did Non-Automatic Benefits Fail to Mediate the Effect of Group Type on Hazing Severity?

Yes; non-automatic benefits explained no unique variance in desired hazing severity (Figure 2).
Did Participants Haze More Severely as High Contributors than as Low Contributors?
Yes; participants desired more severe hazing as high contributors ($M = 5.5$, $SD = 2.86$) than as low contributors ($M = 4.59$, $SD = 2.86$). The effect was small: $d = 0.32$, $F(1,169) = 18.52$, $p < 0.001$.

Did Hazing Severity Positively Correlate with Hazing Coerciveness?
Yes; the more severe the desired hazing, the greater the desired pressure, $r = 0.39$, $p < 0.001$, $N = 175$ ($M = 4.91$, $SD = 2.61$).

Did Automatic Benefits Explain Unique Variance in Hazing Severity for All Groups?
Partially; all groups evidenced a significant relationship between automatic benefits and desired hazing severity (Table 1) save the Audiophiles ($p = 0.37$).

Did Non-Automatic Benefits Fail to Explain Unique Variance in Hazing Severity in All Groups?
Yes; non-automatic benefits explained no unique variance in desired hazing severity in any of the four groups (Table 1).

General Discussion
Although some studies have investigated the effects of hazing on hazees, these experiments are the first to explore the motivations of hazers. All four core predictions of automatic accrual theory were supported and replicated across two experiments. Automatic benefits and group contribution positively predicted desired hazing severity. Automatic benefits appeared to mediate the effect of group type on desired hazing severity, and non-automatic benefits made no independent
contribution to desired hazing severity. Further, desired hazing severity positively predicted desired hazing coerciveness. Nonetheless, there are a number of substantive issues in interpreting these data as well as an interesting exception in the case of the Audiophiles. Of the four groups used in this study, only the Audiophiles evidenced a marginal or non-significant relationship between automatic benefits and desired hazing severity. Why might this be so? The Audiophiles are the sole group with overt internal competitiveness: Participants read that the Audiophiles worked individually to compete with one another. One possibility is that constant intra-group competition creates stratification, which partitions status among group members in a publicly visible manner. If so, a status benefit acquired at group entry (though “automatic”) might be treated as transient (i.e., likely to change due to within-group status competition).

In both experiments, group type predicted significant independent variation in desired hazing severity. Unfortunately, the manner in which group type was manipulated allowed it to represent far more than differential automatic benefits. For participants, manipulating group type likely changed expected sex ratios, age ranges, group sizes, member personality types, and so on. This makes the independent effect of “group type” ambiguous and in need of future unpacking.

Although high levels of simulated contribution increased desired hazing severity, the overall effect was small. Participants may have had difficulty simulating a long history of contribution in the context of a brief, hypothetical questionnaire. Consequently, this effect may be different in real life and deserves further exploration. To test desired hazing severity, participants indicated how stressful they
wanted an initiation to be for newcomers. While this measure may represent a decent first approximation, real-world hazing processes can be spread out over weeks, months, or years. Given this apparent variation, allowing participants to specify the stressfulness and duration of hazing may provide a more accurate indicator of desired hazing severity. Finally, although not addressed by the experiments in this paper, automatic accrual theory may also make predictions that fall under the solidarity macro theory. For instance, given that free riding in collective actions causes cooperators to lower their own contribution levels (e.g., Fehr & Gachter, 2000), hazing may provide a cue to other veteran members that successful free riding by newcomers is effectively impossible. Providing this cue may help guarantee high levels of continuing cooperation from veterans, even during periods of changing coalition composition. As such, one possible prediction of automatic accrual theory is that if veterans are prevented from hazing, they will lower their own contribution levels.

Limitations and Future Directions

Automatic accrual theory is a logical extension of many prior theories relevant to hazing (see the discussion of the macro theories). It shares many predictions with other hazing theories, including predicting high levels of hazing in cooperative groups and hazing as a means to encourage free riders to disassociate (e.g., Alcorta & Sosis, 2005; Iannaccone, 1992; Moreland & Levine, 2002; Walker, 1968; Young, 1965). However, automatic accrual theory predicts the specific benefits that will and will not motivate hazing (i.e., automatic/non-automatic benefits), directly predicts motivated coercion in hazing, and may help in explaining why hazing includes a temporary
period of increased dominance over newcomers. That said, automatic accrual theory is part of a larger project to explain hazing with a high degree of generality and does not uniquely predict many particular manifestations of hazing, such as genital mutilation in adolescent initiations. The adoption of these specific practices may be due to causal processes that are separable from the ones predicted by automatic accrual theory (e.g., Sosis et al., 2007; Wilson, 2008). Further, automatic accrual theory is a preliminary theoretical effort and (if correct) will need to be complemented by other theories to generate a complete explanation of hazing. Numerous open questions remain: Is “solidarity” generation one of the functions of hazing motivation? Is hazing motivation designed to contribute to enduring dominance differences or just temporary dominance differences? To what extent is hazing motivation designed to allow for accurate inferences of intrinsic valuation in hazees?

In pursuing future studies of hazing, it is important to note that there is no large body of empirical work that directly supports any theory of hazing using operationalization and measurement\(^8\). Thus, much of what is thought to be already known about hazing (e.g., it “increases solidarity”) is derived from a wealth of descriptive and anecdotal data. While these data are interesting and important, we have very little scientific understanding of what motivates hazing and what replicable psychological effects it produces. How do we move towards creating a complete,

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\(^8\) This includes studies that test hazing’s capacity to generate cognitive dissonance, which have produced a number of contradictory and equivocal findings. See Hautaluoma and Spungin (1974), Finer et al. (1980), Hautaluoma et al. (1991), Enge (1993) and Lodewijkx and Syriot (1997, 2001).
causal theory of hazing? I have argued that a comprehensive understanding of hazing must include an investigation of hazing’s motivational precursors. The experiments in this paper suggest that one such precursor may be a specific, evolved response to prevent the exploitation of automatic group benefits.
Table 1

*Group Benefits as Predictors of Desired Hazing Severity*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Name</th>
<th>Automatic Benefits</th>
<th>Non-automatic Benefits</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Automatic Benefits</th>
<th>Non-automatic Benefits</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ice Walkers</td>
<td>.28*</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Workers</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bug Watchers</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audiophiles</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Within each experiment column, rows represent OLS regressions. All values are standardized beta coefficients.  
* *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*
Figure 1. (From Experiment 1) All non-parenthetical values are standardized beta coefficients from an OLS regression predicting hazing severity with automatic benefits, non-automatic benefits and group type (strongly cooperative = 1, weakly cooperative = 0), $R^2 = 0.46$. Parenthetical values represent the indicated variables individually regressed on group type.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure 2. (From Experiment 2) All non-parenthetical values are standardized beta coefficients from an OLS regression predicting hazing severity with automatic benefits, non-automatic benefits and group type (strongly cooperative = 1, weakly cooperative = 0), $R^2 = 0.46$. Parenthetical values represent the indicated variables individually regressed on group type.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. 
cooperative = 0), \( R^2 = 0.24 \). Parenthetical values represent the indicated variables individually regressed on group type.

\[ *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. \]

**Supplemental Information**

In Experiment 1 (Sobel test = 2.90***) and Experiment 2 (Sobel test = 3.19**), apparent mediation effects were conventionally significant.

Experiments 1 and 2 surveyed participants about whether they had ever been members of an organized athletic team, Greek letter organization, or the military. This was done to ensure that current or past exposure to high-risk groups was not having an effect on desired hazing severity. When included as a dichotomous variable (0 = no participation, 1 = participation) in the overall OLS regression (seen in Figure 1 and 2), participation in one or more high-risk groups had no effect on desired hazing severity in Experiment 1 (group type = .53***, auto benefits = .24**, non-auto benefits = .02, exposure to high-risk group = .08, \( R^2 = .46 \)) or Experiment 2 (group type = .27**, auto benefits = .26**, non-auto benefits = .04, exposure to high-risk group = .02, \( R^2 = .25 \)).

At the end of the procedure, both experiments also asked participants if each group they viewed a) reminded them of a real-world group and b) if so, whether that real-world group typically hazed. This was done to test whether any tendency to haze might be due to participants simply conforming to what they believed real-word analogs typically did. This was measured as a dichotomous variable\(^9\) (0 = similar to

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\(^9\) The overall OLS regression used in Figures 1 and 2 used the averaged ratings across the two groups viewed by each participant. Thus, although this particular variable is measured dichotomously, in this
real-world non-hazing group, 1 = similar to real-world hazing group). Participants wrote their own answers to questions a) and b) in Experiment 1, and thus they were manually coded as 0 or 1 by the experimenter. For Experiment 2, participants indicated their answer by selecting an option rather than writing their response. Regardless, when included in the overall OLS regression, this variable had no effect on desired hazing severity in Experiment 1 (group type = .49***, auto benefits = .29**, non-auto benefits = .04, reminded of hazing group = .01, $R^2 = .44$) or Experiment 2 (group type = .25**, auto benefits = .31**, non-auto benefits = .06, reminded of hazing group = .02, $R^2 = .29$).

Experiments 1 and 2 used simple, univariate analyses in assessing the overall relationship between desired hazing severity and desired hazing coerciveness. However, in retrospect, a multivariate analysis may be more informative. Simultaneously regressing desired hazing coerciveness on group type, sex, exposure to high-risk group, and desired hazing severity revealed that desired hazing severity remained the primary predictor in both Experiment 1 (group type = -.02, desired

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It is averaged such that a participant can have 1 = both groups similar to real world hazing group, 0.5 = one group similar to real-world hazing group, or 0 = neither group similar to real-world hazing group. Because it was possible for participants to indicate that one group reminded them of a real-world group (hazing or non-hazing), while the other did not, a total score of 1 or 0 can also indicate that a single group was reminiscent/non-reminiscent of a real-world hazing group, while the other group counted as missing data: it was unlike any group the participant was familiar with, and thus the participant could have no judgment of their real-world hazing proclivities. Running overall OLS regressions for each group viewed, rather than averaging responses as described above, also resulted in non-significant effects for this variable.
hazing severity = .58***, sex = -.03, exposure to high-risk group = .05, \( R^2 = .33 \) and Experiment 2 (group type = .11, desired hazing severity = .34***, sex = .01, exposure to high-risk group = -.06, \( R^2 = .17 \)). Using hierarchical entry, sex also marginally interacted with desired hazing severity in Experiment 2 (Step 2: sex x desired hazing severity = -.18, \( p = .067 \), total \( R^2 = .18 \)), such that the relationship between coerciveness and severity appeared larger for women than men. In Experiment 2, when sex was added to the overall OLS regression (group type = .26**, auto benefits = .26**, non-auto benefits = -.04, sex = .07, \( R^2 = .25 \)), it marginally interacted with automatic benefits in predicting desired hazing severity such that the relationship appeared larger for men (Step 2: sex x automatic benefits = .16, \( p = .066 \), total \( R^2 = .26 \)). Given the absence of the above marginal interactions in Experiment 1 and the much larger experiment performed in Chapter 3, they are likely due to chance.

To make sure participants were actually attending to the stimuli, Experiment 2 included three manipulation/comprehension checks where participants rated the coordination level, danger the group faced, and the cost of their own contribution level. Effects were as predicted: The strongly cooperative groups used in the study were seen as more coordinated (\( r = .53*** \)) and more dangerous (\( r = .82*** \)), while high contribution was seen as more costly than low contribution (paired \( t \)-test, \( t_{174} = 33.47*** \)).

Experiment 2 included two exploratory rating questions. The intent was to see whether participants believed their judgments of their group’s status and mutual aid benefits were shared with outsiders. In general, they were. Thus, if participants believed that outsiders saw the group as high in status, they also tended to personally
believe that newcomers would gain high status by joining \( (r = .84^{***}) \). And if participants believed that outsiders perceived the group as providing high mutual aid to its members and newcomers, they also tended to personally believe that newcomers would benefit highly from mutual aid \( (r = .66^{***}) \). However, note that the first relationship is nearly tautological: In what sense can a newcomer gain high status in the eyes of outsiders if the group does not have high status? Further, if one wanted to measure how idiosyncratic participants believed their judgments to be, even in an exploratory sense, one would want to ask about the anticipated correspondence between participants’ and outsiders’ perceptions for all rating questions. And while it might be curious if participants tended to believe their own judgments were idiosyncratic, it is not clear that any inferences could be drawn from such an observation.

In performing additional analyses, Experiment 2 was found to be slightly imbalanced in the ordering of one condition: ~65% of participants started with the high contribution prime rather than ~50%. This had no impact on results: Regardless of order, the effect size of contribution in predicting desired hazing severity was nearly identical \( (d = .34 \text{ if the initial prime was high contribution, } d = .32 \text{ if the initial prime was low contribution}) \).

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Chapter 3

Hazing in a Representative US Sample

All findings require replication. Chapter 3 is an attempt to replicate the effects observed in Chapter 2 using a larger and more diverse sample. Chapter 3 also continues the efforts of Chapter 2 in refining automatic accrual theory and in further characterizing the regularities of hazing in need of explanation. A version of Chapter 3 is planned for publication.
Why are newcomers to certain kinds of groups subjected to seemingly inexplicable ordeals? That is, why do humans haze? From first-order intuitions, hazing appears puzzling and disadvantageous. Unlike stereotypical bullying, hazing is the abuse of new or prospective group members (hereafter, “newcomers”). And yet hazing is surprisingly common cross-culturally, including small-scale societies and industrialized countries (Allan & Madden, 2008; Campo, Poulos, & Sipple, 2005; Davis, 1998; Herdt, 1998; Hoover & Pollard, 2000; Linhares de Albuquerque & Paes-Machado, 2004; Pershing, 2006; Shaw, 1992; Webster, 1908). Hazing’s cross-cultural prevalence and persistence require explanation.

Cimino (2011) performed the first experimental investigation of hazing motivation on a sample of college undergraduates. Two vignette experiments suggested that aspects of hazing motivation followed an evolutionary logic designed, in part, to discourage newcomer exploitation (detailed below). But to what extent are these experimental results generalizable to non-university populations? Considerable criticism has been leveled at the use of university populations to make inferences about human nature (e.g., Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Stanovich, 2004). Especially in the study of hazing, university populations may appear problematic. After all, universities are host to many organizations that haze (e.g., fraternities, sororities, athletic teams, marching bands, clubs). Even if most students do not participate in such activities, perhaps they exist within a “hazing culture” that encourages them to accept and endorse these activities (Iverson & Allan, 2004). Moreover, perhaps measured predictors of hazing motivation in these populations are idiosyncratic and will not generalize to larger, non-university samples. In this study, I
replicate and extend the basic findings of Cimino (2011) and demonstrate that a representative sample of United States adults (N=914) has nearly identical hazing sentiments as students of the University of California, Santa Barbara. Thus, this study represents the first large-scale, experimental study of hazing motivation.

**Hazing in Theory and Practice**

Hazing is defined here as the generation of induction costs (i.e., elements of the experiences necessary to be acknowledged as a “legitimate” group member) that appear unattributable to group-relevant assessments, preparations, or chance (Cimino, 2011). For example, while intense calisthenics appear group-relevant as an assessment or preparation for firefighters, they seem less so for college fraternity members. Hazing may also be manifest in content-appropriate but intentionally excessive assessments or preparations. This definition of hazing is preliminary and operational. It exists only to approximately demarcate the contexts that are most commonly labeled “hazing” and appear to be in need of additional explanation. Theories of hazing are almost always explicit attempts to explain how such induction practices may be group-relevant, even if they appear otherwise (e.g., Cialdini, 2001; Keating et al., 2005).

Throughout the social sciences, most explanations of hazing can be categorized under three macro theories: solidarity, dominance, and commitment. Many researchers have suggested or implied that hazing ordeals increase group solidarity, (e.g., camaraderie or effective cooperation), establish dominance over newcomers, or allow for the selection of committed members. The macro theories do not represent three principled and well-established theories, but rather a way to order
a diverse set of claims and speculations regarding hazing’s origins and persistence (see review in Cimino, 2011). In actuality, there is little direct scientific evidence for any theory of hazing. And although calling the ideas “macro theories” suggests testability, most claims made about hazing are not formulated in a way that is easily testable. For example, the idea of “group solidarity” may appear straightforward and intuitive, but solidarity’s operational entailments are diverse and contested (see reviews in Dion, 2000; Friedkin, 2004; Hogg, 1992).

More importantly, it is not clear that social scientists have a unified representation of what needs to be explained about hazing. The success of any theory of hazing will ultimately depend on its ability to provide more than a plausible account of hazing’s effects on hazees. Any successful theory will also need to directly predict hazing’s fundamental, core characteristics.

**Commonalities of Hazing Behavior**

The manifest content of hazing is profoundly variable: Sleep deprivation, intoxication, beatings, calisthenics, servile labor, and scarification are just some of its multitudinous incarnations. Many locally and historically contingent factors are likely at play in the adoption or persistence of specific hazing practices (e.g., cultural transmission biases, see Richerson & Boyd, 2005). But what uniformities are evident beneath this cultural variability? Below I detail four important regularities of hazing that are directly observable and pre-theoretical (cf. Schroeder, 2004). These regularities form a critical part of the explicanda for any theory of hazing.

**Temporary: Hazing has a restricted time course.**
The hazing ordeals experienced by newcomers do not normally recur later in their tenure. The restricted time course of hazing further separates it from simple bullying or abuse. (Few prototypical bullies acknowledge the existence of a bullying expiration date.) A group’s hazing ordeals, for instance, could also have a predictable periodicity (e.g., annual) or represent a set of ongoing obligations that continue after group entry (like some costly religious practices, e.g., food restrictions, see Sosis & Alcorta, 2003). Instead, the ordeals seen in hazing are usually temporary and have a jointly-acknowledged point of cessation.

**Unidirectional: Hazing is solely directed at newcomers.**

Hazing ordeals could logically be mutual, with veterans and newcomers subjecting one another to the same practices during the induction period. Instead, however, costs are almost never shared: Newcomers suffer at the hands of veterans, but not vice-versa.

**Coercive: Hazing is inflicted.**

Hazees are often coerced into being hazed. This may include cajoling, yelling, intoxication, group intimidation, and other tactics (e.g., Baier & Williams, 1983; Colton, 1993; Herdt, 1998; Houseman, 2001; Johnson, 2002; Whitehouse, 2005). In some societies, being hazed is simply an inescapable social obligation (e.g., certain

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1 Certain ostensible exceptions deserve consideration. There are graded associations with hazing-like ordeals at the boundaries of each rank (e.g., Barth, 1975). However, grades within these associations may be perceived by their members as separate coalitions (e.g., Kroeber, 1932), making “re-hazed” members actually newcomers into different coalitions. Other examples of apparent re-hazing appear less explicable, however (e.g., Newman & Boyd, 1998), and may represent separable causal processes (e.g., extreme attempts at socialization for aggression and warfare, Ember & Ember, 2010).
New Guinean secret societies, see Herdt, 1998). In these cases, hazees have no choice but to participate. And while hazers do not always engage in extreme coercion, they appear to rarely engage in dispassionate requests for newcomers’ willful participation.

**Coalitional: Hazing arises in long-term cooperative alliances.**

There is no natural law that prevents all human social groups from engaging in some form of hazing. Regardless, hazing is largely found among cooperative alliances that a) are expected to endure across many collective actions and b) have engaged in some collective actions in the past (e.g., secret societies, athletic teams). Thus, aggregations of community members do not haze fellow community members who arrive after some arbitrary time point (e.g., staggered arrivals to a bus stop). Temporary task groups formed to perform a specific collection action (e.g., fish, construct a hut) do not commonly engage in hazing. Even long-term alliances do not seem to haze those who join immediately after formation (e.g., minutes after a group’s founding). Instead, hazing is concentrated in cooperative alliances that—in the minds of their members—have both a past and a future.

Once hazing is viewed in light of these four characteristics, certain common explanations of hazing become less plausible. For example, one solidarity theory of hazing posits that it represents an attempt (conscious or unconscious) to create cognitive dissonance in hazees (e.g., Cialdini, 2001). The basic proposition is that

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2 The “coalitional” regularity is intended to draw a strong and reliable contrast between groups that sometimes engage in hazing and groups that almost never engage in hazing. It is not a comprehensive description of the necessary and sufficient group properties for hazing to arise. Such a list of properties is presently unknown (but see relevant commentary in Tiger, 1984; Tooby et al., 2006).
individuals who undergo costly ordeals will attempt to justify their effort by increasing their liking for the hazing group (Aronson & Mills, 1959). But if this is so, why is hazing temporary—if effort justification can increase group liking, why not just continue hazing? Further, why is hazing unidirectional? Would it not be advantageous for veterans to have to further justify their effort by being abused by newcomers? Additionally, given that cognitive dissonance can be diminished by reducing the perception of choice (e.g., Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007), why is hazing so commonly coercive? Why does hazing even exist in environments where hazees have no choice but to participate? And if hazing can increase group liking, why is it concentrated within coalitional groups? After all, group liking has demonstrably positive effects on the efficacy of many task groups (see meta-analysis in Beal, Cohen, Burke, & McLendon, 2003).

Thus, regardless of whether hazing can—or cannot\(^3\)—generate cognitive dissonance, theories that make the effect central to the genesis or persistence of hazing fail to predict basic and recurrent features of the phenomenon.

**The Evolutionary Logic of Hazing**

Why, then, do humans haze? What we presently call “hazing” is likely due to a number of different, separable causal processes. Nonetheless, it may be possible to

\(^3\) A few early experiments generated apparent effort justification and increased liking via severe initiations (Aronson & Mills, 1959; Gerard & Mathewson, 1966; Schopler & Bateson, 1962). Later attempts at replication—including real-world tests—produced negative or equivocal results (Enge, 1993; Finer, Hautaluoma, & Bloom, 1980; Hautaluoma, Enge, Mitchell, & Rittwager, 1991; Hautaluoma & Spungin, 1974; Lodewijkstra & Syroit, 1997, 2001). Surprisingly, the effect has never been demonstrated in men (but see Keating et al., 2005).
unpack these processes with sub-theories that can eventually be combined to provide a comprehensive theory of the phenomenon. One reason why hazing occurs may be that the human mind is equipped with psychological mechanisms that motivate the strategic devaluation of coalitional newcomers (Cimino & Delton, 2010; Delton & Cimino, 2010). These mechanisms may have evolved because of the adaptive problems posed by coalition newcomers. Below, I detail the stepwise logic behind this sub-theory of hazing.

**Automatic Accrual Theory.**

1) The ability of coalitions to endure across multiple overlapping membership generations was adaptively important throughout many human ancestral environments. This was particularly true for warfare (Bowles, 2009; Tooby & Cosmides, 2010), but also for the realization of shared interests across multiple domains (e.g., Cimino & Delton, 2010; e.g., Delton & Cimino, 2010; Tiger, 1984; Tooby, Cosmides, & Price, 2006).

2) Enduring coalitions built up group benefits over time (e.g., club goods, common-pool resources), some of which were logically *automatic* (Cimino & Delton, 2010; Delton & Cimino, 2010), that is, immediately available to newcomers at little or no cost (e.g., status, protection, common property).

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4 Automatic accrual theory is sub-theory focused on hazing as a means to solve time-limited adaptive problems directly associated with group entry. It is logically possible, however, that some effects of hazing are designed to solve adaptive problems that occur significantly outside the entry period (e.g., the putative creation of enduring solidarity among members, which may assist in the maintenance of cooperation).
3) Because automatic benefits were freely available to newcomers, they were also vulnerable to exploitation strategies by newcomers. These strategies may have included a) temporarily associating with a coalition, consuming automatic benefits until successfully excluded, or b) indefinitely associating with a coalition, but relying on early inaccuracies in the estimation of competence and trustworthiness to engage in higher levels of free riding or other forms of exploitation around group entry. In other words, because lower levels of contribution or higher levels of benefit consumption may be the products of lesser skill or a lack of familiarity with group norms, newcomers were able to manipulate cues that normally disarm anti-free rider punitiveness (e.g., Delton, Cosmides, Guemo, Robertson, & Tooby, 2012). These tactics were more profitable in coalitions with significant automatic benefits.

4) The ability of newcomers to take advantage of automatic benefits made the time period around coalition entry a privileged period for exploitation. For veteran members, it made the entrance of an overlapping membership generation a potential cue of heightened exploitation.

5) Partially in response to these adaptive problems, the human mind was selected to strategically devalue newcomers to enduring coalitions. This strategic devaluation may motivate a constellation of responses toward newcomers, including depressing their ability to benefit from the coalition, advertising an increased willingness to inflict costs, and attempting to enforce labor inputs. (For evidence that

5 Other cues, however, may facultatively increase the valuation of newcomers, such as the coalition’s need for members and variance in newcomer quality (e.g., Cini, Moreland, & Levine, 1993; Stiff & Van Vugt, 2008).
real-world hazing includes these features, see General Discussion.) By this theory, certain aspects of hazing were ancestrally adaptive because a) amid a market of prospective members, hazing discouraged a short-term association/exploitation strategy and b) regardless of the existence of a member market, hazing made the abuse of temporary asymmetries in the understanding of newcomer competence and trustworthiness more difficult. Hazing accomplished the former by making the time period around group entry relatively costly. Hazing accomplished the latter by temporarily increasing compliance and conformity in hazees, one product of which was a relative reduction in exploitative behaviors (see General Discussion). Hazing provided direct fitness benefits to hazers by augmenting the coalition’s ability to generate benefits (by increasing labor inputs and decreasing free riding in newcomers) and preventing the decline of cooperation that occurs when successful free riding is present or assumed to be present (e.g., Fehr & Gachter, 2000). 

From the perspective of automatic accrual theory, hazing is temporary because it reflects the operation of mechanisms designed to solve exploitation problems that attenuate over time. That is, over time, the accuracy of veteran estimations of newcomer trustworthiness and competence increases, reducing the

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6 Hazing is costly for hazers due to the time and energy involved. If hazing is, in part, an anti-free rider strategy, does this not create a second-order free rider problem? (That is, why not simply refrain from hazing but reap its benefits?) Hazing, however, is typically a coordinated group activity. The coordinated punishment of free riders is far easier to evolve than the unilateral punishment of free riders and may be an evolutionarily stable strategy (Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010). Because aspects of hazing appear analogous to these models (e.g., shared costs and the potential for conditional participation), its a priori evolvability may be similarly eased.
need for hazing. Hazing is *unidirectional* because the adaptive problem it addresses is inherently asymmetric from the standpoint of veterans: Newcomer status is a vector for exploitation (e.g., Cimino & Delton, 2010; Moreland & Levine, 2002), and the value of newcomers as coalition members is (compared to veterans) relatively unproven. Hazing is *coercive* because the ordeals suffered by hazees are, in part, attempts at gross behavioral regulation and domination during a period of otherwise heightened exploitation (e.g., Stone, 1946; Webster, 1908; Whiting, Kluckhohn, & Anthony, 1958). Finally, hazing is *coalitional* because it was principally enduring coalitions that built up large automatic benefits and thus were most vulnerable to newcomer exploitation. In sum, automatic accrual theory makes predictions that are consistent with—and may partially explicate—hazing’s key regularities.

Automatic accrual theory is a logical elaboration of many theories and hypotheses relevant to—but not necessarily focused on—hazing (e.g., Boyer, 2001; Iannaccone, 1992; Moreland & Levine, 2002; Sosis, Kress, & Boster, 2007; Tiger, 1984; Vigil, 1996). Like other, similar ideas, automatic accrual theory implies that hazing is partly a coalitional anti-free rider strategy\(^7\). The goal of automatic accrual theory is to provide a detailed evolutionary account of some of the selection pressures that might favor the evolution of hazing behaviors, make precise predictions about the cues that will motivate hazing at the individual level (i.e., the perception of automatic but not non-automatic benefits), and help explain the existence of a focused period of

\(^7\) Hazing is not being proposed as a general solution to the problem of free riders (i.e., a “magic bullet” that allows cooperation to evolve in humans). The claim here is much more modest: A sub-component of hazing motivation is being proposed as a set of counter-strategies that operated against certain manifestations of ancestral coalitional exploitation.
dominance surrounding hazing ordeals. Additionally, automatic accrual theory is explicitly designed to be experimentally testable using standard psychological methods.

Cimino (2011) tested and found evidence consistent with four basic predictions of automatic accrual theory:

1. Because strongly cooperative groups generate high levels of automatic benefits, membership in such a group will motivate greater hazing severity than membership in weakly cooperative group. In other words, the predicted difference in hazing severity between these group types will be mediated via differences in automatic benefits.

2. If one function of hazing is to prevent the exploitation of automatic benefits, non-automatic benefits will predict no unique variance in hazing severity when automatic benefits are statistically controlled.

3. Because being a high contributor to a group entails disproportionate contribution to the maintenance of automatic benefits, members with high levels of contribution will haze more severely than members with low levels of contribution. Note that prior work on punishment suggests that high contributors are more willing to punish free riders (e.g., Price, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2002). By this logic, high contributors should be more willing to haze potential free riders as well.

4. If hazing is designed, in part, to create costs that prevent or discourage near-term exploitation, hazers should be increasingly willing to coercively inflict these costs as the chance of exploitation increases. In other words, if hazing severity
reflects the likelihood of exploitation by newcomers, it will positively predict hazing coerciveness.

The primary goal of this paper is to attempt to replicate these four findings on a large, diverse, non-university population.

**Methods**

**Participants**

All participants were members of Knowledge Networks’ online research panel in April of 2006. This panel is designed to provide a representative sampling of the United States population. Panel members were recruited using Random Digit Dialing (RDD) and offered internet access in exchange for their participation in the panel. Individuals who did not have a computer were given WebTV devices. Aspects of Knowledge Networks’ sampling methodology cause slight deviations from representativeness (e.g., some oversampling of certain geographic regions), and thus stratification weights provided by Knowledge Networks are used in all analyses and descriptive statistics to ensure the representativeness of the sample at the time it was collected. (For more information on Knowledge Networks’ panel and methodology, see [http://www.knowledgenetworks.com](http://www.knowledgenetworks.com).) In total, 456 men and 458 women between the ages of 18 and 92 ($M\pm SD = 45.56\pm16.46$) participated in the experiment. Racial makeup was 69.8% white, 12.7% Hispanic, 11.2% black (non-Hispanic), 3.2% other (non-Hispanic), and 3.1% mixed race (2+ races, non-Hispanic). Nearly half of the sample (46.3%) had never attended college.

**Materials and Procedure**
The entire experiment was computerized. Participants were randomly assigned to complete a questionnaire about a fictional group: strongly cooperative (i.e., high levels of cooperative interdependence) or weakly cooperative. The strongly cooperative group was the Ice Walkers, a single-sex extreme sports group specializing in arctic environments. The weakly cooperative group was the Bug Watchers, a single-sex group of entomology enthusiasts. (The sex of the group always matched the sex of the participant.) Fictional and uncommon groups were chosen so that they had no publicly-known hazing status. Each questionnaire described typical group activities and instructed participants to imagine themselves as current members. Following each group description, participants were randomly assigned to read that they were either high group contributors (e.g., they expended high effort in group activities and volunteered to provide additional help when needed) or low group contributors. After doing so, they completed a manipulation check that required them to rate their perceived cost of personal contribution. In sum, the study used a 2x2x2 design: group type (strongly cooperative vs. weakly cooperative) x contribution (high vs. low) x sex.

**Non-Manipulated Questionnaire Components.**

For each group, participants read that membership was contingent on the ability to get along with existing members as well as the possession and demonstration of group-relevant skills or attributes. This was followed by a series of questions about participants’ impressions of how the group will benefit new members. The first three questions concerned automatic benefits: to what extent the group will increase the status, available group aid, and the short-term, zero-effort skill
acquisition of newcomers. The final benefit question asked about non-automatic benefits, in this case the long-term, high-effort skill acquisition from group membership (see Appendix for stimuli). Questions were answered on seven-point rating scales (displayed as 0-6 but analyzed as 1-7).

Participants read that the group had recently decided to have an initiation for new members. As current members, participants were allowed to voice their input on how the initiation should be conducted. This consisted of a) whether the initiation should have a pleasant component, and if so, how pleasant (included to balance any demand characteristics); b) whether the initiation should have a stressful component, and if so, how stressful; and c) whether all new members should be pressured to complete the initiation, and if so, to what extent.

**Operationalization and Composite Variables.**

“Automatic Benefits” were operationalized as the sum of the status benefit, the group aid benefit, and the short-term, zero-effort skill acquisition benefit. “Non-Automatic Benefits” were operationalized as the long term, high-effort skill acquisition benefit. “Hazing Severity” was operationalized as the desired stressfulness of the initiation. “Exposure to College” was operationalized as a dichotomous variable where 1 = attendance of any college and 0 = achievement of a high school diploma or less. “Exposure to High-Risk Group” was operationalized as a dichotomous variable, where 1 = past or current membership in a Greek letter society, organized athletic team, or the military and 0 = no past or current membership in any of the three types of groups. (This variable was included to account for any influence of past membership in groups that commonly haze). “Group Type” was coded as 1 =
strongly cooperative and 0 = weakly cooperative. “Sex” was coded as 1 = male and 0 = female.

**Results**

All predictions (save those specified below) were tested using standard multiple regressions. Interaction variables were tested using hierarchical entry to isolate their statistical effects. Because there are a variety of sex-differentiated aspects of coalitional psychology (e.g., Tiger, 1984; Tooby & Cosmides, 2010), sex was tested as a moderator on all non-control variables. Potential interactions with sex were first tested individually. Conventionally significant interactions were then placed into the final model at Step 2 (Table 1). Only significant sex interactions are reported below. All p values are two-tailed.

**Did Participants Haze More Severely in the Strongly Cooperative Group Than in the Weakly Cooperative Group?**

Yes; group type modified participants’ desired hazing severity (Table 1), increasing it in the strong group ($M±SD = 4.07±1.61$) relative to the weak group ($M±SD = 2.91±1.51$), N = 907.

**Did Automatic Benefits Positively Predict Variance in Hazing Severity?**

Yes; participants who believed that newcomers would obtain more automatic benefits desired greater hazing severity (Table 1, Step 1).

**Did Automatic Benefits Appear to Mediate the Effect of Group Type on Hazing Severity?**

No; although automatic benefits explained variance in desired hazing severity across group type (Table 1, Step 1), a separate mediation analysis showed that
automatic benefits only trivially reduced the amount of variance in desired hazing severity attributable to group type (.35 to .33\textsuperscript{8}). This prompted a follow-up analysis, revealing that automatic benefits interacted with group type (Table 1, Step 2), positively predicting desired hazing severity only in the strong group (simple slope of $B = .30, p < .001$). In contrast, automatic benefits did not predict desired hazing severity in the weak group (simple slope of $B = .06, p = .183$). Because automatic benefits only explained variance in desired hazing severity in the strong group, it did not mediate this effect across groups. This mirrors some of the findings from Cimino (2011), which suggested inconsistent effects for weak groups as well (see General Discussion).

\textsuperscript{8} The mediation analysis was designed to approximate that used in Cimino (2011), with the addition of the control variables listed in Table 1. Thus, the result in question came from adding automatic benefits to a standard regression predicting desired hazing severity with controls, group type, contribution, and non-automatic benefits. The small, descriptive reduction in group type was not tested for significance given the subsequent follow-up analysis.
Did Non-Automatic Benefits Fail to Positively Predict Hazing Severity?

Yes; non-automatic benefits explained no unique variance in desired hazing severity when automatic benefits were statistically controlled (Table 1, Step 1).

Did High-Contributing Participants Haze More Severely Than Low-Contributing Participants?

Partially; the contribution manipulation explained no unique variance in desired hazing severity (Table 1, $p = .422$). However, this variable interacted with sex (Table 1, Step 2) such that men in the high-contribution condition desired more severe hazing (simple slope of $B = .10, p < .05$), but women did not (simple slope of $B = -.04, p = .303$).

Did Exposure to College or High-Risk Groups Predict Hazing Severity?

No; neither exposure to college environments or high-risk groups explained unique variance in desired hazing severity (Table 1, Step 1).

Did Hazing Severity Positively Correlate with Hazing Coerciveness?

Yes; the more severe the desired hazing, the more participants wanted newcomers to be pressured into completing the initiation. For comparison to previous findings (Cimino, 2011) this was first tested using a separate univariate analysis, $r = .53, p < .001, M = 3.80\pm1.77, N = 907$. Next, to control for additional explanatory factors, desired hazing coerciveness was simultaneously regressed on age ($B = -.03, p = .243$), sex ($B = .02, p = .437$), exposure to college ($B = -.04, p = .164$), exposure to high-risk group ($B = .09, p < .01$), group type ($B = .06, p = .056$), contribution ($B = -.03, p = .343$), and desired hazing severity ($B = .50, p < .001$), $R^2 = .29, N = 907$. 
Desired hazing severity remained the primary predictor of desired hazing coerciveness.
General Discussion

In prior experiments with a university population, hazing motivation appeared to follow an adaptive logic designed to reduce newcomer exploitation (Cimino, 2011). In the current experiment, using a representative sample of the United States, hazing motivation was almost identically patterned. Participants who imagined themselves as members of a strongly cooperative, enduring coalition desired more severe hazing. Variance in the coalition’s perceived automatic benefits—but not non-automatic benefits—positively predicted hazing motivation. Contribution level, for men, also positively predicted desired hazing severity, and hazing severity positively correlated with hazing coerciveness. Nonetheless, these findings require qualification and elaboration.

The effects of the control variables were straightforward. Women desired less severe hazing, which may reflect generalized sex differences in aggressiveness (e.g., Archer, 2009). Older individuals also tended to desire less severe hazing, reflecting either reductions in aggressiveness over the life course or unidentified cohort effects. Neither exposure to college environments nor exposure to high-risk groups predicted any independent variation in desired hazing severity. This is consistent with the idea that hazing motivation is not simply a curious manifestation of arbitrary and generalized tendencies toward cultural learning. That said, both variables were binary and may not have captured the relevant variation. High-risk groups, for example, are not necessarily hazing groups, and not all college environments may implicitly endorse hazing. It is also worth noting that an effect of past experience in high-risk
groups could also reflect cognitive calibration (e.g., Buss, 2000, p. vii), rather than arbitrary cultural influence.

Automatic benefits functioned as a significant and independent predictor of desired hazing severity. However, group type interacted with automatic benefits such that this effect was not evident in the weak group. This is in contrast to Cimino (2011), where the same weak group (the Bug Watchers) did evidence a relationship, but a different weak group (an audio enthusiast club) did not. Much of the effect of automatic benefits may be contingent on a given coalition being perceived as sufficiently entitative (i.e., having coherent, group-like properties). While highly cooperative groups have many cues to this effect, the same may not be true of the weakly cooperative groups used thus far. This ambiguity may allow for the greater involvement of individual and population-level differences in the projection of entitativity onto social groupings (for an in-depth treatment of entitativity, see Lickel et al., 2000).

An effect of contribution on desired hazing severity was found only for men. The effect of contribution in prior experiments was also small, but did not appear to be sex differentiated. These inconsistent findings may be because the actual effect of contribution is a) non-existent or b) overwhelmed by measurement error due to inadequate manipulations. Given some real-world evidence that contribution level plays a role in desired hazing (see next section), stronger manipulations may be needed to effectively falsify this prediction of automatic accrual theory.

As in prior experiments, group type independently predicted desired hazing severity. One problem with interpreting the effect of group type is that it functions as
an omnibus variable and likely represents the joint effect of numerous cues associated with the organizations. While some of these cues are theory-relevant to automatic accrual theory, others are not. For example, imagining one’s self as a hardcore arctic survivalist may prime a great deal more aggressiveness than imaging one’s self as a potentially-bookish entomology enthusiast. Nonetheless, even if the effect of group type were wholly due to such spurious priming effects, this would not explain why automatic benefits independently predicted variance in hazing severity.

The more severe the desired hazing, the more participants advocated pressuring newcomers into being hazed. This was conceptualized as demonstrating a greater insistence on newcomers being hazed given potential cues of exploitation. However, a more complete conceptualization may be that coercion tracks hazing severity because hazing itself is typically a coercive strategy. If hazing is (in part) an attempt at temporary dominance, hazers should devalue hazee consent, and more extreme hazings should evidence greater devaluation.

Although hazing is sometimes portrayed as a deviant activity, ~84% of this representative sample of the United States chose to at least minimally haze newcomers (i.e., to add a stressful component to the initiation). Even discarding individuals who desired ostensibly “mild” hazing (below the midpoint of the seven-point scale) leaves ~54% advocating a moderate to severe hazing component. These results represent participants making unpressured, anonymous, individual decisions that are intended to represent how they would act in real life. This may suggest that—in the right circumstances—pro-hazing sentiments are common and easily elicited. That said, the experiment tasked participants with crafting an “initiation”. Although
the term is technically neutral with respect to severity (Merriam-Webster, 2013), it may not be seen as such in the population studied.

**Automatic Accrual Theory and The Real World**

This study, along with Cimino (2011), has helped parameterize characteristics of group perception that predict the desire to haze. But do these effects generalize to the real world? There are a number of basic predictions made by automatic accrual theory that appear to obtain in actual hazing groups. For instance, Walker (1968) measured the prestige (an automatic benefit) associated with 29 fraternities at the University of Washington and found a positive association with a measure of their hazing severity. Similarly, Ramey (1982) examined 31 chapters of the fraternity Tau Kappa Epsilon, finding a positive association between their prestige and the “toughness” of their induction process (“tough” fraternity induction processes typically amount to hazing). In the ethnographic record, Young’s (1965) study of male initiations suggested that societies with powerful, established coalitions (and assumedly high automatic benefits) tended to have more “dramatic” initiation practices, with beating/severe hazing operationalized as the most extreme form of drama. (See also Allen, 1967; Strathern, 1970 for compatible observations among tribal groups in New Guinea.) With respect to personal contribution predicting desired hazing severity, Campo, Poulos, and Sipple’s (2005) survey found that leaders of student organizations (who presumably contribute highly to their groups) were more likely to self-identify as hazers than non-leaders. Additionally, Honeycutt’s (2005) account of hazing in an online discussion group suggested that a group of elite members with long tenures were the most insistent on hazing.
If hazing serves, in part, to enforce against otherwise hard-to-detect free riding among newcomers, hazers should be expected to coerce labor inputs during hazing or benefit from an “afterglow” of hazing, whereby post-hazing members are temporarily more compliant and workmanlike (cf. Granzberg, 1972). There is systematic evidence that labor extraction is a common component of hazing for Greek letter societies and athletic teams (Allan & Madden, 2008; Gordon, Hall, & Blankenship, 1979; Hoover, 1999; Hoover & Pollard, 2000; Shaw & Morgan, 1990; Svaan, 1967) as well as in some small-scale societies (e.g., Chapman, 2008; Loeb, 1933). In my own field work with a pseudonymous fraternity (“Alpha”), prospective members are punished harshly if they fail to carry out the assigned labor that is part of their induction. Punishment is manifest in the application of other hazing ordeals, which become a temporary set of powerful, negative incentives for doing anything that existing group members find the slightest bit objectionable. Other accounts suggest that hazing serves as this same kind of punishment for newcomer behavior in other Greek letter societies (e.g., Clark, 1915; Leemon, 1970; Stone, 1946; Walker, 1968). Further, the prediction that hazing may temporarily reduce exploitative behaviors post-hazing is supported by some experimental and survey evidence suggesting that hazing increases conformity and compliance (Granzberg, 1972; Keating et al., 2005). Indeed, my primary informant in Alpha once told me of the “pledge mentality” built up over the induction period, a temporary state that includes unquestioning obedience.

Regardless, automatic accrual theory makes predictions that are more fine-grained than the ones that have been experimentally tested or can be compared with naturalistic data. For example, because of concerns about social desirability, this
experiment used a very simple measure of hazing severity, one designed to capture an immediate “gut” response as to how newcomers should be treated. But automatic accrual theory predicts a textured set of responses that at least sometimes includes labor impositions and gross behavioral regulation. These responses have not been directly measured. Additional testing of automatic accrual theory will also require real-world hazing organizations and non-Western populations.

Finally, automatic accrual theory remains a preliminary and non-comprehensive theory of hazing. Hazing’s complexity and multivocality is attested to in numerous cross-cultural accounts (e.g., Morinis, 1985; Paige & Paige, 1981), and hazing is often located within other social processes that emphasize gender and maturation (e.g., Gregor & Tuzin, 2001; Herdt, 1998). Further, some hazing ordeals may have separable explanations from those suggested by automatic accrual theory (e.g., genital mutilation, Sosis et al., 2007; Wilson, 2008). Nonetheless, the results of this paper suggest that hazing may have systematic, underlying uniformities that reflect the operation of our evolved psychology of intergenerational coalitions.
Table 1

Predictors of Desired Hazing Severity Across US Adult Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>ΔR²</th>
<th>Standardized Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.18***</td>
<td>-.14***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td>.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to College</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to High-Risk Group</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Type</td>
<td></td>
<td>.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution</td>
<td></td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td>.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Automatic Benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Step 2                      | .02***  |                      |
| Group Type x Automatic Benefits |       | .17***              |
| Contribution x Sex          |         | .13*               |

Note. All data are calculated via hierarchical multiple regression. See Methods for variable construction. Total $R^2 = .20$, N = 903.

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Table 2

*Desired Hazing Severity Across Experiment Conditions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Ice Walkers</th>
<th>Bug Watchers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>4.49 (1.55)</td>
<td>3.97 (1.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3.85 (1.75)</td>
<td>3.99 (1.65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Means (standard deviations) of experiment conditions. “High” and “Low” are levels of contribution.
References


Buenos Aires: Museo Maritimo de Ushuaia; Zagier & Urruty Publications.


Chapter 4

Fraternity Hazing and Planned Failure

Chapter 4 breaks from Chapters 2 and 3 to more fully explore ethnographic and historical approaches to hazing. This is the “top down” perspective described in Chapter 1. Note that Chapters 2 and 3 were primarily concerned with explaining very broad regularities in hazing behavior. Chapter 4 begins to explore the fine-grained details of how hazing is conducted in a particular organization. A version of Chapter 4 is planned for publication.
Hazing—the abuse of new or prospective group members—is a common cross-cultural phenomenon (e.g., Allan and Madden 2008; Haas 1974; Herdt 1998; Linhares de Albuquerque and Paes-Machado 2004; McCarl 1976; Schlegel and Barry 1979; Vigil 1996). For its recipients, hazing can be deeply unpleasant and may consist of torturous ordeals or servile labor. Hazing is defined here as the generation of induction costs (i.e., elements of the experiences necessary to be acknowledged as a “legitimate” group member) that appear unattributable to group-relevant assessments, preparations, or chance. This definition exists to separate induction experiences that appear necessarily unpleasant (e.g., enduring exhausting calisthenics to become a fire fighter) from those that appear arbitrarily unpleasant (e.g., enduring exhausting calisthenics to become a college fraternity member). Within anthropology and other social sciences, numerous functional and symbolic characteristics have been attributed to hazing and hazing-inclusive phenomena (e.g., initiations). Despite having different foci (e.g., secret society inductions, adolescent rites of passage, gang initiations) many theories and hypotheses concerning severe initiations have considerable thematic overlap and emphasize how such inductions create solidarity, establish dominance, or help select committed members (see review in Cimino 2011). This paper exists to advance the anthropological understanding of fraternity hazing by a) identifying a heretofore unexamined component of said hazing b) empirically establishing its widespread prevalence and c) offering principled speculations regarding its purpose and effects on hazees. This is distinct from proposing an overarching theory of hazing or rites of passage (e.g., Cialdini 2001; Gennep 1909; Young 1965), or an overarching theory of fraternity hazing itself (e.g., the creation of
a masculinized identity, Sanday 1990; Taylor 2010). Note that hazing within fraternities is simultaneously common and poorly understood. There is a dearth of detailed accounts of fraternity hazing (see exceptions in Arnold 1998; Leemon 1970), and little synthetic work exists that focuses on establishing and explaining similarities in content and context across many different fraternity hazing processes (e.g, Dundes and Dundes 2002). Thus, there is an abiding need to examine fraternity hazing systematically, unpacking and making a case for some important set of explicanda.

Using my field work with a United States college fraternity, interviews with members of other fraternities, and archival accounts of fraternity hazing, I examine a common feature of fraternity inductions: planned failure. Planned failure occurs when a task is assigned to a new or prospective member that is specifically designed to induce failure. Planned failure, for fraternities, appears to be one of the primary means by which hazing is deployed and justified.

**Alpha and the Nature of Fraternity Inductions**

“Alpha” is a pseudonymous United States college social fraternity. For approximately twenty months I maintained a research relationship with Alpha and was allowed to observe any weekly meetings that occurred as well the intense hazing process associated with new members. The initial goal of my project was to directly observe and survey multiple fraternities about their initiation practices. While I was aware of the avowed secrecy attached to hazing, I assumed that I could eventually earn the trust of many different hazing fraternities (à la Walker 1968). Despite considerable effort, this was not the case. Instead, a single fraternity agreed to be a part of my project: Alpha. (Non-Alpha fraternity members were continually surprised
that any fraternity had allowed my presence.) Thus, my project became a detailed, strict accounting of Alpha’s hazing process. Alpha agreed to allow me to observe their practices with the understanding that I would use no audio or video recording devices and make a monthly donation to the chapter (donations varied, but were typically $100 or $200). As such, my time with Alpha was observational: I did not participate in the hazing of pledges (i.e., inductees) I was not hazed myself, and prior to this study, I had no association with Alpha. I was allowed to observe all of Alpha’s pledging events, with the following caveats: 1. A few events were multi-chapter gatherings (I did not have permission to observe other chapters) or conflicted with available time/scheduling. 2. Parts of some events were straightforward calisthenics after a formal event had been completed (e.g., a run with a single member following the pledges). I did not directly observe these calisthenics sessions. 3. Although Alpha has a “standardized” induction process\(^2\), there is variation across induction periods based on pragmatics and the opinions of whatever member is placed in charge of the induction. Thus, some events were not witnessed simply because they were not used during my observation period. Any events that I did not directly observe due to scheduling conflicts, multi-chapter gatherings etc. were explained to me in detail by members of Alpha. Throughout this paper, any Alpha ordeal that I did not observe first-hand will have an asterisk(*).

Finally, it should be noted that pledging a modern college fraternity, including Alpha, cannot be fully encapsulated into formal, circumscribed pledging events. Especially as the pledging process reaches its climax, pledges are called in at odd hours by fraternity members, spend time with other pledges to prepare for ordeals,
and manage many other aspects of fraternity life. I did not (and could not) directly observe all of these happenings.

Paradoxically, the mere fact that Alpha allowed my presence may suggest that it is not a good exemplar of fraternities or fraternity hazing. As such, the primary argument of this paper (that planned failure is common among fraternities) does not rely exclusively on observations from Alpha. The second half of this paper contains supporting interview data from members of other, non-Alpha fraternities and an extensive review of decades of archival accounts of fraternity hazing.

Hazing is presently illegal in most US states and is against the explicit rules of Alpha’s associated university and national organization. As such, my agreement with Alpha bars me from discussing identifying details of the fraternity, including its real name, precise location, racial makeup, and other demographic characteristics. (By extension, my agreement also bars me from generating any “rich” ethnography of Alpha, as doing so might inadvertently identify the chapter. Consequently, the discussion of Alpha’s induction process will not be situated within a detailed description of the organization’s day-to-day existence.)

Alpha shares many features common to United States fraternities, including the broad outlines of its induction process (e.g., Rhodes 1968; Svaan 1967; Whitehead 1970). Like most modern fraternities, Alpha’s induction process has two major stages: rush period and pledge period. During rush, the fraternity attempts to attract and preselect prospective members for the fraternity. Rush activities are typically parties or social gatherings that are designed to highlight the positive aspects of fraternity membership (e.g., male camaraderie and access to women). At the
conclusion of rush, preferred rushees are given “bids,” that is, formal offers to join
the fraternity’s official induction process and become “pledges.” The pledging
process is divided into a number of events with the professed purpose of socializing
pledges into the fraternity. (For some fraternities—including Alpha—pledging events
are largely hazing events.) At the successful completion of pledging, pledges are
ritually initiated into the fraternity and become “actives” (i.e., non-alumni members).

Alpha’s rush period is approximately two weeks in length and consists of four to
six activities, while its pledge period is approximately eight to ten weeks long, with
two to three pledging events per week. The final week of pledging breaks from this
schedule and consists of multiple pledging events each day. Every pledging event is
mandatory for all pledges and lasts three to four hours, though there appears to be
considerable variation. All active members are typically present for pledging events.
One or more actives are designated as leaders for all or part of a given event. It is the
job of the leaders to explicitly direct and assess the behavior of pledges. (Other
actives may do so informally, however.) Alpha’s pledging events usually have a
tripartite appearance:

1. Line-up. Garbed in identical, loose-fitting attire, pledges line up in front of
actives. They announce their designated pledge class name (a set of Greek letters) and
stand at attention. In doing so, they adopt a ritualistic stance called “Alpha stance.”
(Alpha stance is mildly uncomfortable over long periods of time, but is not an ordeal.)
During line-up, the event’s designated leaders may critique and punish the pledges for
perceived social violations since the last event or may simply move directly to warm-up.
2. Warm-up. Various calisthenics are usually performed at the beginning of pledging events. These include common exercises (e.g., push-ups, sit-ups) and less common exercises that I am forbidden from identifying. The term “calisthenics” suggests mild and quotidian exercises, but the calisthenics used by Alpha can be profoundly exhausting and occasionally involve physical trauma. Additionally, because pledges are usually barred from consuming water during events, Alpha’s calisthenics can be particularly unpleasant.

3. Ordeals. Alpha’s ordeals show a great deal of variation across events. In brief, ordeals typically involve a host of difficult calisthenics and the ingestion of noxious food items, but may also include exposure to cold, water intoxication, and long running events. Most importantly for this paper, many ordeals are centered in some way around Alpha’s “pledge book.” It is the pledge book that serves as the fulcrum point for planned failure.
Planned Failure

Alpha’s pledge book enumerates the goals and ideals of the fraternity and provides general guidelines for pledge behavior. (These are common features of pledge books, see Johnson 1941). Pledges are required to memorize items from the pledge book, including other chapter names and founding dates, past presidents, pledge classes, and oaths/mottos. During ordeals, pledges may be tasked with reciting any number of items from the pledge book. Judging by the performance of pledges during events and by my conversations with actives, the memorization of pledge book items is difficult. (Many items are simply names and dates, and as such are difficult to retain in memory.) Perhaps the most telling demonstration of this difficulty is that actives often refer to the pledge book to check the answers that pledges provide them. Thus, even members who have necessarily completed the pledging process—and have inducted pledges in the past—still require some assistance in recalling pledge book items.

Failure to correctly recite pledge book items within the patience of the leading active(s), usually a matter of seconds, leads to hazing of some sort—most commonly calisthenics and the loud, collective disapproval of the actives. A significant portion of the hazing experienced by pledges is explicitly justified by their failure to correctly recite information from the pledge book. However, “correctly” reciting information from the pledge book is made purposefully difficult and sometimes effectively impossible.

For Alpha, “correctness” has multiple dimensions. Pledges must speak the items loudly and clearly, and they must not mispronounce any word. Even a single mistake
in a long series of correct recitations can be met with hazing. Further, recitation tasks are often split up between pledges, with mistakes from one pledge creating hazing ordeals for all pledges. Pledges must also announce their answers in the proper manner (e.g., with an appropriate honorific such as “sir”). During their recitation, they must sometimes perform calisthenics or simply adopt an awkward and tiring physical position. While meeting these criteria is difficult, the conditions are made more trying by the nature of the pledging process. Pledges are typically exhausted and thirsty, and are variably nauseated, confused, cold, sleep deprived, or simply in the throes of pain. Thus, even if they “know” the answer to a question, they may be unable to produce the answer quickly or clearly. Any violation along any dimension of correctness may be cited as a justification for further hazing. Making matters more difficult, the dimensions of correctness are not uniformly reinforced by actives. Some actives appear to ignore violations along one dimension while emphasizing violations along another. Because multiple actives are typically involved in any given pledging event, the idiosyncratic standards of actives can generate additional confusion and failure among pledges. Thus, pledges may believe that they are reciting a pledge book item correctly, only to be faced with a different leading active who decides that the pledges have failed (e.g., they are not reciting items loud enough or fast enough).

If pledges manage too many successful answers, actives may increase the difficulty of the questions asked, if necessary going so far as to ask for the number of commas or periods on a given page of the pledge book. (These are not facts that pledges are asked to memorize.) Such extreme measures are rarely needed: Pledging events are rife with incorrect recitations.
The Elusive Nature of Success in Pledging Events

Even given the multiple dimensions of correctness and idiosyncratic preferences among actives, it is nonetheless true that pledges sometimes answer a string of questions correctly and that providing correct answers is preferable to incorrect answers. Correct answers are met with at least the brief approval of the actives. Further, because most pledging events seem to have an approximate target duration, providing correct answers can reduce the net time during which pledges are exposed to ordeals. This is especially true early in the pledging process, as early events are less difficult and actives are more willing to allow for a succession of correct answers.

However, in some cases correct answers only provide the appearance of reducing net exposure to hazing ordeals. For instance, one pledging event features an ordeal during which pledges must answers questions from the pledge book. Each incorrect answer requires a bite of a noxious food item as punishment. This food item tends to generate intense nausea and vomiting, especially when bites are taken in quick succession. By correctly answering questions, pledges appear to be reducing the overall unpleasantness of the ordeal. Unbeknownst to the pledges, however, the event requires that all food items be completely ingested by its conclusion. Thus, successful recitations only redistribute the eating process to the end of the event, wherein pledges are simply tasked with finishing whatever food remains. (By succeeding earlier in the event, pledges may be creating an ordeal for themselves that is more unpleasant, as doing so concentrates the inevitable eating into a shorter and more intense period.)
Another Alpha event uses a similar format with a different (though equally nauseating) food item. Again, in this event, the objective is to recite items from the pledge book, with mistakes punished with bites of noxious food. In one performance of this event, I witnessed a visiting alumnus lecture a pledge. He emphasized to the suffering pledge that if the pledge had simply learned the pledge book—if he had performed well—he would not be suffering. Strictly speaking, this was untrue—the event secretly requires that pledges consume a non-trivial quantity of noxious food. The questions that pledges must answer are simply the method by which this pre-defined quantity is delivered and justified. Had the pledge in question provided only correct answers, the actives would have worked to make sure that he subsequently failed.

While most Alpha pledging events are designed to allow for at least some success, a few events allow only for failure. For instance, one event requires that pledges be brought into a room individually, surrounded by actives, and subjected to heavy calisthenics and intimidation. At multiple points during this event, actives question the pledge. Inevitably, all answers are wrong and the pledge is screamed at and punished. Another event requires that pledges cook a dinner for actives. No matter the quality of the dinner, the actives feign disgust and outrage at the poor dinner they have received from the pledges*. Yet another event requires that pledges perform hundreds of push-ups in a single night*. Even though this event is a mandatory component of the pledging process (and always occurs around the same time), the entire event is typically framed as a punishment for pledge misbehavior, even when such misbehavior is non-existent and must be manufactured. Finally, during many
events, actives will yell out incorrect answers or distracting statements, hoping to prompt a mistaken recitation from a pledge.

Within pledging events, failure is not merely what occurs prior to hazing. Even the hazing ordeals themselves have implied failure conditions, all of which may generate more hazing by actives. Recall that most of Alpha’s hazing is inflicted via calisthenics or the ingestion of noxious food. Both hazing methods are dose-dependent in their severity and capable of generating relatively uncontrollable failure states (i.e., muscle failure and vomiting), and these failure states are sometimes punished by actives. But consider the precursors to these failure states: physical exhaustion leads to slow and ineffectual exercises, while food-driven nausea leads to a natural hesitance to consume further. Both precursors inspire the ire of actives, who are continually disappointed by pledges. Such disappointment appears an emergent theme of most pledging events and typically manifests itself in yelling or the application of additional ordeals. Actives commonly proclaim that the tasks given to pledges are simple and easy, making the pledges’ performance all the more pathetic. Having witnessed some of these same actives struggle through their pledging process, I know that their claims are exaggerated. However, pledges are always given the impression that they are particularly incompetent.

Given all of the ways for pledges to fail and all of the seemingly recursive failures that may follow, it may appear as though there is a great deal of variance in hazing severity that is dependent upon pledge performance. However, as suggested above, each of Alpha’s pledging events has an associated, baseline severity level. That is, actives have a shared representation of how unpleasant each event should be, at
minimum, and generally do whatever is required to obtain this severity level. Thus, while some events allow for poor pledge performance to increase the overall severity, there are no events that allow for good pledge performance to decrease the severity below the (usually significant) baseline. This fact is always kept secret from pledges.

**Evidence of Planned Failure in Neighboring Fraternities**

I have thus far described basic features of Alpha’s induction process, which is rife with hazing and planned failure. But to what extent is Alpha representative of other hazing fraternities? Generally, fraternity members are deeply secretive about hazing, especially given the aforementioned legality concerns. Thus, while I was able to make an arrangement with Alpha to allow my presence, other fraternities I spoke to completely rejected the idea of my presence during their secretive pledging activities, even given promises of anonymity. I was, however, able to perform a number of semi-structured interviews with individuals associated with several neighboring, non-Alpha fraternities. Below are four interviewees who had been hazed by their fraternity, exposed to their entire pledging process, and consented to be quoted (they are labeled as belonging to the pseudonymous fraternities F1 - F4). These individuals agreed to speak with me with the understanding that their names, chapter names, and fraternity names would be kept confidential.

“John” described the hazing process of F-1, outlining similar practices to Alpha. Like pledges of Alpha, John was required to memorize the contents of a pledge book. I inquired about whether successful memorization allowed pledges to escape hazing or whether actives tried to get the pledges to fail regardless. John stated, “Of course,
yeah, of course. You never get off easy. Doesn’t matter whether you have the whole fucking [pledge] book memorized. You’re obviously going to be doing some shit.”

“Mark,” of F-2, indicated that planned failure was used in “every single [pledging] event” in his fraternity. For example, he described one event that required memorization and recitation, where failure was punished with hazing. He explained that the pledges of F-2 were purposefully made to fail three times before the event was concluded.

“Steve” of F-3 completed a pledging process with multiple examples of planned failure, including the following:

At one of the events, we had to take our red cup [from the fraternity house] and run to [a specific location], scoop sand and [run back to] fill up a bucket in the house. And we were timed for one lap, and we had to meet or beat that time for every future lap, until the bucket was filled. And every time you returned you had to fill up your red cup with beer and drink it…So that was definitely set up so you would fail and get hazed further.

“Jeremy” of F-4 also indicated that planned failure was used in his induction process. He summed up some of these events as follows:

[The events] weren’t designed to make us fail, necessarily, they were just hard enough to where [the actives] know that a lot of [the pledges] are going to fail. They know a lot of [the pledges] are going to [succeed] also, but they know “oh, well, these amount of [pledges] are going to fail” and I think that’s kind of the mind game that they use. It’s because, if you [fail at] something, and your pledge brother [succeeds] …[then you] just look like complete shit compared to your pledge brother. And it gives the actives an excuse to yell at the pledge or whatever.

Note that although Jeremy says that the events were not “designed to make us fail,” he appears to mean only that the events were not designed to generate absolute
failure. Instead, they were designed to generate failure in a non-trivial proportion of the pledge class, enough to justify additional hazing.

The above quotes suggest that there are at least four neighboring, non-Alpha fraternities that haze with planned failure. However, although fraternity members are secretive about hazing, it is logically possible that information has been shared among members of these different fraternities, directly or indirectly (e.g., Piper 1897). This might cause the hazing practices of Alpha and nearby fraternities to be correlated by virtue of their proximity and unrepresentative of fraternities from other areas. One way to remedy this problem is to examine accounts of fraternity hazing across time and throughout the United States.

Evidence of Planned Failure in Fraternity Hazing Throughout the United States

In unambiguous instances of planned failure with hazing, induction tasks are purposefully designed to generate failure which is then punished with hazing. However, this definition involves inferences about hazer intent—do hazers actually want hazees to fail? Most large-scale studies of hazing practices (including fraternities) have focused on the relative prevalence of different ordeals (e.g., drinking games, scavenger hunts, calisthenics, see Allan and Madden 2008; Hoover 1999; Hoover and Pollard 2000). While these studies have established that hazing is widespread, they do not allow for strong inferences about the context of hazing ordeals. This leaves archival accounts of fraternity hazing. Because such accounts do not typically have information about hazer expectations, extrapolation is sometimes required. That said, the circumstances of hazing can be telling: Impossible tasks, double binds, and other conditions are strongly suggestive of planned failure. Below I
review a number of archival accounts of fraternity hazing that imply at least some use of planned failure.

Johnson (1941) surveyed a total of 136 chapters divided among Phi Delta Theta, Phi Gamma Delta, and Phi Kappa Psi. The chapters were distributed widely in the United States, though three chapters were located in Canada. One section of Johnson’s survey queried the chapters on their methods of disciplining pledges. Johnson asked whether pledges were ever “urged or motivated to try to reach goals of any sort which are known to be utterly beyond the range of their abilities…” (1941:89). Many chapters (~46%) indicated that they at least “sometimes” did so. In this case, the explicit connection to hazing is missing, as Johnson provides little information about the context of these disciplinary actions. However, there are other indications that fraternities of this era were hazing with planned failure (see below).

Stone (1946:42-45) described the final week of pledging in a California chapter of Alpha Tau Omega, which may have included planned failure: “Pledges are instructed to do anything that members tell them. The pledges are paddled for little or no reason. They are made to appear as ridiculous as possible by various devises. There is continual loud shouting by members to keep the pledges in a state of anxiety and worry as to what they have done to anger the members.” (1946:42, emphasis added).

Butler (1959) examined pledge treatment in six anonymous Kansas fraternities. In three of the fraternities, he noted that pledges found it “impossible to live up to the expectations of the active members” (1959:138). Butler explained that pledges of these groups were “often bewildered by the many actives’ various interpretations of
the rules” (1959:138) and indicated the use of seemingly arbitrary punishments (1959:139).

Golburgh (1965:1-6) presented the experiences of an unnamed pledge at an unnamed fraternity. The pledge seemed to summarize his general experience, writing “I was on alert to carry out the next command that would be bellowed at me. No matter how precisely I carried out the task, I would be wrong. My words meant nothing…I was a pledge of a college fraternity.” (1965:1, emphasis added).

Leemon (1970) described the pledging process of an unnamed fraternity in the Middle Atlantic. Like Alpha, this fraternity used “line-ups.” In one such line-up, pledges were ordered to light the cigarette held by an active. The active made sure they failed (by blowing on the pledges’ lighters) and the group then hazed them for their failure (1970:161).

McMinn (1980) performed a content analysis of the ritual manuals of 22 college fraternities. Such manuals rarely appear to codify any hazing practices. However, four of the manuals did specify a small ordeal that the pledge faced near his initiation into the chapter. Three of the four ordeals required that the pledge fail (1980:154-158).

Raphael (1988:80-90) interviewed a pseudonymous member of an unnamed chapter of Beta Theta Pi (“Joseph A.”). Joseph described being subjected to periods of sleep deprivation while being made to memorize sets of arbitrary items (i.e., insulting nick names). Any failure at recitation was punished by bites of raw onion, among other ordeals. Note that, like Alpha, the circumstances of recitation seem to guarantee high levels of failure.
Sanday (1990:148-179) discussed hazing in several unnamed college fraternities. Part of her account included a seemingly impossible pledge race (1990:173) and a rigged contest in which an exhausted pledge was challenged to do more push-ups than an active member (1990:176-177).

Wright (1996:7-8) observed a fraternity hazing event (ostensibly in California) wherein pledges were made to drink whiskey and then attempt to recite items of fraternity lore. Wright described a pledge being spat on for a seemingly inevitable recitation error.

Arnold (1998:179) described an event from the pledging process of the pseudonymous “Iota Nu Sigma” of Indiana. Pledges were made to participate in “frog races,” two-person sprints around an impromptu obstacle course. Every race logically necessitated a loser, who would then be punished with further hazing ordeals. Frog races appeared to continue until all (or nearly all) pledges had failed.

Nuwer (2004:32-50) interviewed an unnamed pledge of an unnamed hazing fraternity. Regarding his general experience, the pledge stated that “One thing you learn right away as a pledge is that you will never be right whether you are right or not right.” (2004:40).

Land (2004) recounted being hazed by a chapter of Kappa Sigma in South Carolina. He described an ordeal that consisted of seemingly impossible questions, where all wrong answers were punished by the ingestion of heated beer (2004:123-124).

Taylor (2010) described fraternity culture in several unnamed Southern and Midwestern chapters. She suggested that:

The [pledges] are punished frequently because the members make it impossible for the pledges to ever
make the right choice. Punishment is usually enacted on the initiate’s body through intense exercise such as excessive push ups or through visual humiliation by forcing the pledges to wear certain clothes or crawl on the floor like animals. [Taylor 2010:42, emphasis added]

Westmoreland and Wolff (2010) interviewed an individual named John Burford, who was hazed by a New Jersey chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon. Regarding his hazing process, John stated, “We [the pledges] would do something exactly right, and they would make up something that we did wrong and haze us over it. You get worried that every time you’re gonna do something, you’re gonna get yelled at.”

Finally, I communicated with Dave Westol, alumnus and ex-chief executive of Theta Chi, past advisor to fraternities at Michigan State University, and consultant to Alpha Tau Omega (letter to author, November 7, 2011). Westol experienced, investigated, and had numerous hazing events reported to him. When I described planned failure to him, he estimated that it was involved in some 75% of hazing events that he had exposure to in his various roles. As examples, Westol told me that written tests were sometimes given to pledges and falsely scored such that all (or a majority) of pledges failed. He described labor activities given to pledges (e.g., house cleaning) that were impossibly evaluated, such that pledges were always judged to have under-contributed or to have completed the task in an unacceptable time. Westol also described Sisyphean events, such as one where pledges were tasked with putting out a fire in a fireplace, using only the water they could collect in their mouths from a floor above them. Pledges would run upstairs, collect water, and then run downstairs, futilely attempting to douse the fire. Another event Westol described appeared similar to practices used in Alpha:

Pledges are told that they have "screwed up" and they must report to the chapter house or another
location, usually late at night. They are blindfolded (or not) and led into a room. The room is dark and members, some of whom have been drinking, are sitting in chairs. The pledges are lined up, blindfolds are/are not removed, and then members begin yelling questions at the pledges. No matter what answers are given to the questions, the answers are not correct or not recited correctly or not delivered in a manner that satisfies the members.

Note that, like Alpha, it appears that answers to questions are subject to multiple dimensions of correctness. Pledges may actually be providing a correct answer, but inevitably fail by recourse to some meta-element of their recitation: rapidity, volume, formality, etc.

In sum, the evidence collected from Alpha, neighboring fraternities, and numerous archival accounts of fraternity hazing spanning at least 70 years indicates that planned failure is a systematic and enduring component of fraternity hazing.

Possible Explanations for Planned Failure

Why, then, does planned failure exist in fraternity hazing? Why do actives go to great efforts to frame their hazing as a kind of avoidable punishment for task-based failures, even though failure is both planned and inevitable? Below I will explore a number of possible contributors to the genesis and persistence of planned failure.

To begin, it is not clear that fraternity members typically have a conception of planned failure as a separable component of the hazing process. In Alpha, for example, it appeared to be understood that making pledges fail was simply how one hazed. No member of Alpha volunteered the logic of “planned failure” to me, and answers as to why they used hazing in the first place were along standard lines for fraternity members (bringing pledges together, getting pledges to show respect/commitment, e.g., Scott 2007). However, my primary informant in Alpha,
“Thomas,” seemed more philosophical about hazing than anyone else in the chapter. I asked Thomas whether he had ever thought about planned failure, in any way, before I had pointed it out to him:

Yeah, all the time, because I think that’s where, like, hazing…when I execute it, comes into play. Like, “Okay, we have to do a little bit of hazing tonight. They’re just gonna fail. And we’re just gonna keep on making them fail. Like there’s no way out of it. Like there’s gonna be, say, a set number of push-ups…and then they’re just gonna have to do it. There’s no other way around it.” So yeah, there’s a lot of planned failure and a lot of times it’s set in to help them overcome an obstacle that we, again, that we set for them…and a lot of times, I feel too, it’s to put ‘em in their place. Kind of like the inferiority, put them in the hierarchy between pledges and actives.

In describing what he thought of planned failure, Thomas seemed to mix traditional fraternity explanations for hazing (e.g., instilling a hierarchy) with practical concerns (i.e., making sure pledges could not somehow avoid ordeals). But again, the impression that pledges could, in principle, avoid ordeals is created by the fraternity itself. This makes planned failure an awkward “solution” to a problem that is entirely manufactured. Are there additional reasons that planned failure might seem intuitively preferable to fraternity members?

One possibility is that planned failure is an attempt to shift some of the responsibility for hazing. If hazees believe that they can avoid some hazing, but continually fail to meet the conditions for doing so, they may blame themselves or “the rules,” rather than the hazers. This is especially so if the rules of hazing are seen as pre-dating the hazers, who are themselves bound by tradition. Bitterness towards one or more hazers is a possible outcome of being hazed (e.g., Butler 1959:138; Jones 2004:78; Nuwer 2004:35-36), and individual hazers may strive to avoid being targets. Indeed, members of Alpha sometimes emphasize to pledges that the hazing process is
just business,” which may be part of such an effort. Similar concerns may contribute to the celebratory and loving atmosphere that typically accompanies the completion of fraternity hazing.

Another possibility is that fraternity members believe that pledges are likely to be entitled and arrogant due to past experiences, and failure is an intuitive means of correction. Consider Clark (1915:72), who quotes a letter from a fraternity member, stating, “The average freshman is young, un-tried, and usually fresh from high school triumphs; his ego is largely developed, he does not consider that the fraternity is conferring a favor on him, but that his presence is largely a condescension.”

Compare Clark (1915) to Walker (1968), writing over 50 years later, describing a near-identical sentiment among the fraternities at the University of Washington:

Pledges who were student body presidents are given no special recognition and high school heroes are forbidden to wear their letterman’s jackets. The pledges are often told: “Your previous life is past. Now that you are a pledge in this house you have to make a new life. You can’t draw on the past for your status now. You have to achieve it in a new system and with different people.” Such treatment is hard to take for many boys who have previously basked in the adulation of their entire high school as well as their own community, but from the fraternity’s viewpoint a reorientation of the pledge from high school achievements to those of college and fraternity is of utmost importance. [1968:164-165]

Within Alpha, I asked my primary informant whether he was ever concerned that pledges might enter the fraternity with an inflated ego. Thomas replied: “Oh yeah. All the time. And we pick them out so like, ‘Here’s the cocky ones, and these are the ones we’re going to break.’” Thomas went on to explain that all the pledges needed to be “broken,” not simply the cocky ones, but cockiness was among the devalued attributes in pledges. The sentiments noted by Clark, Walker, and Thomas may
contribute to the intuitive sense that pledges *should* fail, as allowing them to do otherwise might inflate their sense of self worth.

A related and more rarefied possibility is that planned failure is seen, intuitively, as having psychological utility for organizational socialization. Interestingly, this intuition may be correct (Schein 1968). Numerous real-world psychology studies suggest that different socialization tactics have measurable impacts on the attitudes and performance of incoming organization members (see review in Bauer, et al. 2007). By “socialization tactics” these researchers mean the general methods of performing an induction into an organization (e.g., inducting members collectively or individually, using a set or variable schedule of induction “events”). Some of these tactics (e.g., collective inductions) appear more likely to generate what Van Maanen and Schein (1979) call a “custodial” orientation (i.e., conformity to the expectations associated with one’s role as a group member) while others appear more likely to generate an “innovative” orientation (i.e., a willingness to change the purpose and procedures associated with one’s role as a group member). Certain characteristics of incoming members appear to moderate the impact of socialization tactics. Individuals who expect themselves to be highly competent within their roles seem to be less affected by socialization tactics, including those that would otherwise engender a custodial orientation (e.g., Jones 1986; Saks 1995; and see meta-analysis in Saks, et al. 2007). This raises the possibility that organizations that value the preservation of their traditions will adopt induction practices that can lower the expected competence of incoming members (Schein 1968). One such induction practice may be the repeated application of planned failure.
Planned failure is logically a subset of what Schein (1968) calls “upending experiences.” In discussing upending experiences, Schein is concerned with newcomers to businesses, but his insights are applicable to other cooperative organizations: “Upending experiences are deliberately planned or accidentally created circumstances which dramatically and unequivocally upset or disconfirm some of the major assumptions which the new man holds about himself, his company, or his job.” (1968:4). Schein gives examples of assigned newcomer tasks that are exceptionally easy (and thus communicative of a lesser status) and assigned newcomer tasks that are impossibly difficult (and thus communicative of a lesser competence). The latter component thus overlaps with what I am calling “planned failure.”

Note that although planned failure may exist in other, non-hazing organizations, the intensity of planned failure used by Alpha and ostensibly other fraternities appears an outlier. Fraternities, however, may face several severe socialization problems, including 1) a recurrent and unavoidably high turnover and 2) a population of prospective members that overestimate their future competence as actives. Given that members of fraternities seek to preserve their traditions (and thus desire and reinforce custodial attitudes in pledges, Arnold 1998; Desantis 2007; Walker 1968), these problems reduce the potential efficacy of their methods.

Consider, first, problems associated with turnover. Fraternities are constantly losing active members through graduation and other sources of attrition (Scott 1965:176). In the time that I studied Alpha, they lost (and replaced) most of their actives. Rapid changes in group composition pose numerous difficulties for the perpetuation of the group qua group (e.g., McCarter and Sheremeta 2013; Simmel
1898; Walker 1968). Newcomers, for instance, may have different ideas about the legitimacy of existing group discourses and practices. They may seek to undermine the current leadership, change the group’s symbology, or create any number of other perturbations. When turnover is rapid, newcomers are constantly entering the organization, increasingly the likelihood that at least one of them will create unwanted changes.

Second, consider issues of expected competence. Common experience and systematic research suggest that newcomers to organizations are often tentative and unsure of themselves upon group entry (see reviews in Wanberg 2012). If such an initial stance were common to fraternity pledges, it would lessen the value of attempting to lower perceptions of competence. However, it is possible that prospective members of fraternities possess particularly high expectations of competence (e.g., Golburgh 1965:5-6). Such expectations may be quite rational: From the outside, it is not clear that social fraternities actually “do” anything in particular. Outsiders may see little reason why they could not succeed in a group of friends with a fancy name attached to it. Indeed, popular media portray fraternity life as a long series of parties, casual sex, and pranks. There is comparatively little media showing fraternities logging hours at charity events, managing a house budget, dealing with conflicting personalities, or trying to coordinate group activities (e.g., house cleaning, multi-chapter gatherings). Several Alpha actives have remarked to me about the difficulty of “active life” and how they felt unprepared for its hardships. Within Alpha, it is sometimes said that “pledging is hard, but active life is harder.”
Finally, another contributor to planned failure may be the lived, scholastic environment of fraternity members. Anthropological research has amply documented the sometimes arbitrary ranking and success/failure conditions seen throughout modern education (e.g., Demerath 2009; Varenne and McDermott 1998). Constant exposure to such a system may make a scholastic approach to hazing obvious and salient to fraternity members. Indeed, some elements of fraternity hazing resemble a bizarre, hellish version of college life: futile test preparation, followed by cruel assessment, followed by inevitable failure, followed by punishment; all conducted amidst loads of busywork (e.g., menial labor) under arbitrary authorities, with constant reminders of poor performance. But this potential influence should not be taken as a prime mover—hazing with planned failure is not the unique creation of American college fraternities. In my readings of the anthropological literature on hazing, I have come across indications of the phenomenon in other cultures.

For example, Loeb (1933:168) described the Kuksu cult initiation among the Northwest Hill Maidu of California. He noted that: “During their confinement the [initiates] had their ears and noses pierced with cedar splinters (bono um). While this was said to have been done as punishment for infraction of the rules, it seems certain that all neophytes suffered the penalty.”

Bateson (1936:131-132) seemed to suggest that planned failure was common among the Iatmul of New Guinea:

On another occasion [the initiates’] mouths are opened with a piece of crocodile bone and examined ‘to see that they have not eaten what they ought not’. They are not under any food taboos at this time, but the result of the examination is invariably the discovery that the mouth is unclean; and the bone is suddenly jabbed against the boy’s gums making them bleed. Then the process is repeated for the other
jaw. In the ritual washing, the partly healed backs of the novices are scrubbed, and they are splashed and splashed with icy water till they are whimpering with cold and misery. The emphasis is upon making them miserable rather than clean. \textit{In the first week of their seclusion, the novices are subjected to a great variety of cruel and harsh tricks of this kind} and for every trick there is some ritual pretext.

Turner (1977:37) implied that planned failure was used in at least some pre-industrial initiations, stating:

The grinding down process is accomplished by ordeals; circumcision, subincision, clitoridectomy, hazing, endurance of heat and cold, impossible physical tests in which failure is greeted by ridicule, unanswerable riddles which make even clever candidates look stupid, followed by physical punishment, and the like. [emphasis added]

Boyer (2001:244) commented on the Beti of Cameroon, noting that “the [initiates] are for instance told to wash in mud puddles. If they oblige they are beaten up for getting dirty; if they refuse they are of course beaten up for staying unwashed.”

Van Rooyen, Potgieter, and Mtezuka (2006:31) discussed the traditional initiation school among the Southern Ndebele people of South Africa, noting, “Initiation is a period during which the individual is continuously being tested and invariably even the best effort is judged by the supervisors of the initiation to be inadequate and deserving of a beating.”

The above examples do not establish that planned failure is common within the broad ethnographic record of hazing initiations. However, examples from such divergent cultures do suggest that hazing with planned failure can arise and persist independently of American college fraternities and any cultural peculiarities that may accompany them. Thus, while it may well be that something about American fraternities increases the frequency of hazing with planned failure, it is not the case
that hazing with planned failure requires a theoretical explanation unique to American society or its relevant sub-cultures (e.g., universities).
General Discussion

This paper began by noting that it was not an attempt to generate a new, overarching theory of hazing. But how does planned failure impact extant theoretical perspectives on hazing? As discussed in the introduction, the three most common themes in hazing theorizing are solidarity, dominance, and commitment. While hazing with planned failure can be seen as one possible means of the administration or testing of these properties, it is not clear that any broad theory of hazing directly predicts or requires planned failure. This does not mean that such theories are faulty, only that they are not yet sufficiently granular.

What about extant perspectives on fraternities or fraternity hazing? One popular framing of fraternities is what one can call “masculinity gone wrong”: the notion that fraternities create phallocentric identities and perpetuate homophobia, hypermasculinity, and similar ills (e.g., Allan 2004; Martin and Hummer 1989; Murnen and Kohlman 2007; Sanday 1990; Stombler 1994; Stombler and Martin 1994; Syrett 2009; Taylor 2010). However, planned failure is not as obviously gendered as some elements of fraternity hazing (e.g., using feminizing insults) and thus is not as easily explained as a manifestation of corrupted or exaggerated masculinity. Hazing with planned failure is still amenable to feminist perspectives (perhaps it is hypermasculine to secretly induce failure while hazing) but it does not appear to be directly predicted or required.

This paper has suggested a number of principled reasons why hazing with planned failure may exist and persist in fraternities. This includes the reduction of personal responsibility for hazing, diminishing ostensibly “cocky” attitudes among pledges,
and inducing a custodial orientation towards fraternity traditions. These explanations are not statements of naive functionalism—in practice, hazing with planned failure may create none of the aforementioned effects. Instead, these explanations are intended to capture some of the shared intuitions among fraternity hazers, which collectively increase the frequency of planned failure, regardless of its ultimate efficacy.

The empirical demonstration that hazing with planned failure is a common feature of fraternity inductions should assist academics in theorizing about fraternity hazing. The phenomenon captures more than the frequency of a given ordeal (e.g., drinking, calisthenics), it captures a generalizable context for ordeals that may have a significant time depth in Greek letter societies. In determining the ultimate impact of hazing practices, how hazing is framed to hazees may be as important as the content of the hazing itself.
Notes

1. This is an operational definition and not a claim about the “true nature” of hazing. Indeed, the hypotheses explored in this paper suggests ways in which hazing may be group relevant to fraternities. That said, hazing has attracted the attention of academics and policy makers because it appears unjustified and in need of explanation. This definition is an attempt to demarcate the induction practices that prompt such first-order intuitions.

2. According to my primary informant, Alpha’s induction process is orally transmitted and has no written, canonical version.

3. My agreement with Alpha requires that I withhold certain aspects of their hazing practices, including the specifics of the nauseating food fed to pledges.
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Chapter 5

Conclusion
The studies collected in this dissertation represent preliminary attempts to measure predictors of hazing motivation (e.g., benefit automaticity) as well as understand manifestations of hazing in particular organizational contexts (i.e., planned failure in college fraternities). These approaches ask different questions, operate at different levels of analysis, and use differing methodologies. In summation:

1. A subset of hazing motivation may be designed to reduce certain forms of newcomer exploitation. Automatic benefits appear to be a predictor of hazing motivation, and their operation as such is argued to reflect the aforementioned design. As with any initial findings, multiple lines of converging evidence are needed to establish validity, reliability and boundary conditions. Further, given the widespread use of hazing and the evolutionary claims on offer, cross-cultural methodologies are a logical next step.

2. Some hazing—especially fraternity hazing—appears to incorporate planned failure. Planned failure is a description of the context of some hazing ordeals and captures the nearly impossible tasks that sometimes function as justifications for hazing. While many sources collectively support the claim that planned failure is common in fraternity hazing, speculations about the intuitions that contribute to its high prevalence in fraternities (see Chapter 4) are tentative until quantified and tested.

Like many complex social phenomena, hazing presents numerous unsolved problems, most of which have not received sufficient research attention. Perhaps the
most common belief regarding the effect of hazing is that it creates abiding feelings of group solidarity among hazees, or between hazees and hazers\(^1\). But is this true?

Ethical concerns rightfully prevent realistically severe or lengthy hazing in laboratory studies. Thus, the relatively small number of existing laboratory studies on hazing’s psychological impacts use minimally unpleasant ordeals, such as briefly saying erotic words or acting like a dog (e.g., Aronson & Mills, 1959; Keating et al., 2005). Compare such experiences to the months of hazing experienced by pledges of Alpha: the constant barrage of intimidation and yelling; the vomit, sweat, and bloody knuckles from brutal calisthenics and nauseating food; the fear, exhaustion, thirst, pain, and tedium. In juxtaposition, it is difficult to see how experimentally induced “severe” initiations can be treated as unproblematic microcosms of genuinely severe hazing. While there are likely continuities in the psychological impacts of both minimal and maximal hazing, it seems equally likely that there are dramatic discontinuities as well, akin to those between stubbing a toe and losing a leg. Thus, additional naturalistic and longitudinal studies of the impact of lengthy and severe hazing are needed (à la Lodewijkx & Syroit, 1997). This is especially so given that beliefs about the ability of hazing to generate group solidarity are focused on inductions that are undeniably intense, not mildly vexatious.

\(^1\) Automatic accrual theory predicts that hazing will, for newcomers, temporarily increase workmanlike behavior or temporarily reduce exploitation. While such effects might be categorized as “solidarity” in a broad sense, they do not speak to this version of the solidarity hypothesis, which proposes that hazing can generate deep and enduring feelings of group dedication or liking. None of the latter effects are strictly required by automatic accrual theory.
Finally, recent and historical hazing events in the United States (e.g., Nuwer, 1990) have inspired a number of organizations to highlight hazing’s negative and unintended impacts, including occasional deaths and serious injuries.

HazingPrevention.Org (HPO), for example, sponsors National Hazing Prevention Week and engages in extensive anti-hazing advocacy. One focus of HPO’s advocacy has been the concept of “hidden harm”:

Consider the "baggage" that today's students can bring with them to high school or college. Have you dealt with or do you know anyone who: Suffers from depression or another mental health issue? Has served in the military - been in a war zone? Been sexually assaulted? Comes from an alcoholic family? Has suffered the loss of a friend or family member? Has had an alcohol or other addiction? Has attempted or seriously considered suicide? Is on medication or has been in counseling for a mental health disorder? Has been abused physically or emotionally? Has been hazed or bullied before? All of the above backgrounds - as well as countless others we can't even imagine, much less know about - could puts [sic] someone at higher risk of being re-traumatized through hazing. (HazingPrevention.Org, 2013)

While it is plausible that some forms of hazing could interact with existing mental health issues, the population of hazees purportedly at risk of being “re-traumatized” seems incredibly large: anyone with seemingly any past/current mental health issue or negative life event and “countless [other backgrounds] we can’t even imagine”. This would seem to predict a world in which hazing is commonly traumatizing hazees in ways that are not widely acknowledged. If true, this would dramatically increase hazing’s profile as a public health hazard. At present, however, “hidden harm” is a hypothesis, rather than a finding. For example, Allan and Madden’s (2008) National Study of Student Hazing examined a selection of potential negative effects of hazing. Three questions appeared to be the best operationalizations
of traumatization used in the hidden harm hypothesis: whether hazees felt depressed, visited a health center, counselor, or doctor, or felt like they “[did not] want to live anymore” (i.e., suicidal ideation). However, Allan and Madden found that only 3% of hazees felt depressed, 2% visited a health center, counselor, or doctor, and 1% experienced a form of suicidal ideation. Thus, the largest survey of hazing ever performed, including 11,482 participants from 53 schools, does not support the pervasive traumatization predicted by the hidden harm hypothesis. But these results are not without caveats: Allan and Madden used simple, binary questions to address health outcomes and may not have captured the relevant variance or constructs. Moreover, the given percentages reflect all hazees in their sample, regardless of severity. As such, these numbers may be higher or lower in subgroups that use particularly severe hazing ordeals (e.g., fraternities). Additional studies that target current and past hazees are needed to fully understand the extent of hazing’s negative psychological impacts.

The above section highlights hazing’s strange profile of open questions: Is hazing a profound means to bond hazees, a crucible of deep psychological harm, or somehow both? Given hazing’s cross-cultural antiquity and years of public controversy in the US, it is remarkable that the state of scientific knowledge on these questions is effectively “we don’t know.” Our understanding of the processes that motivate hazing is similarly impoverished, with much speculation focusing on ostensible moderators (e.g., societal acceptance of hazing, gender norms, groupthink, see Johnson & Holman, 2004; Nuwer, 2004) rather than why we should expect humans around the world to create hazing, even where it does not already exist.
Hazing is desperately in need of multiple, comprehensive research programs and cross-field collaborations. It will be a significant accomplishment when we can confidently characterize such an enduring anthropological puzzle.
References


Appendix
Chapter 2: Experiment 1

Group Vignettes
You are in a group called the “Ice Walkers.” You are all deep snow skiers: specialists in arctic survival skills and high altitude skiing. Several times a year, your group goes on an expedition. An Ice Walker expedition requires a helicopter trip to a remote, mountainous location, where you and your fellow members are left alone for weeks at a time. There, in the freezing wilderness, your life depends on the completeness of your survival knowledge and the resourcefulness of your fellow group members. All of your activities require intense cooperation to be successful: you must hunt, climb, and carry supplies together.

You are in a group called the “Aid Workers.” You are all Emergency Medical Technicians specializing in international humanitarian work. Together, your group travels to undeveloped countries to provide emergency medical care in war-torn areas. The job of the Aid Worker is dangerous. You are regularly shot at, and you must navigate complex international conflicts. Nonetheless, you are not soldiers, and you do not carry guns. As an Aid Worker, all of your activities are dependent on other members: you regularly carry patients together, assist in immediate medical care, and depend on one another to keep watch in tense situations.

You are in a group called the “Bug Watchers.” You are all insect enthusiasts: individuals specializing in the study and collection of insects. Every week, you and your fellow members meet to compare insect collections, organize trips to relevant museums and discuss articles about insects. Members take turns presenting information on various insect species and commenting on the presentations of fellow members. All of your activities require an excellent knowledge of insects and a willingness to provide constructive criticism.

You are in a group called the “Audiophiles.” You are all collectors of high-end audio equipment. Individually, you spend time customizing your stereo systems to deliver only the most pristine and impressive sound. Every week, you and your fellow members meet to compare stereo equipment, organize trips to trade shows, and discuss the current state of the art in stereo products. Members take turns demonstrating their audio setups for other members, competing to have the best current system. All of your activities require a thorough knowledge of acoustics and electronics.

Contribution Primes
Low: You participate in the Ice Walkers much less than other members. You only go on expeditions occasionally, as they are physically draining and expensive. While on expeditions, you enjoy yourself, but you're not usually doing as much work as other members.

High: You participate in the Ice Walkers much more than other members. You go on every expedition, despite their physically demanding aspects and monetary cost. You
give each and every expedition as much effort as you can muster. You often volunteer to take on otherwise unpleasant jobs in the group.

*Low:* You participate in the Aid Workers much less than other members. You go only go on assignments occasionally, as they are extremely dangerous. The assignments are rewarding to some degree, but you don't find yourself as motivated to work as others members.

*High:* You participate in the Aid Workers much more than other members. You go on every assignment, even when the assignment is very dangerous. You give each and every assignment as much effort as you can muster. You often volunteer to take on otherwise unpleasant responsibilities within the group.

*Low:* You participate in the Bug Watchers much less than other members. You go only go to meetings occasionally, as they tend to conflict with your schedule. Bug Watcher meetings are rewarding to some degree, but you don't find yourself as motivated to work with the group as other members.

*High:* You participate in the Bug Watchers much more than other members. You go to every meeting, even when it inconveniences you greatly. You give each and every event as much effort as you can muster. Your often volunteer to take on unpleasant responsibilities within the group.

*Low:* You participate in the Audiophiles much less than other members. You only go to meetings occasionally, as they tend to conflict with your schedule. Audiophile meetings and competitions are rewarding to some degree, but you don't find yourself as motivated to work with the group as other members.

*High:* You participate in the Audiophiles much more than other members. You go to every meeting, even when it inconveniences you greatly. You give each and every meeting and competition as much effort as you can muster. Your often volunteer to take on otherwise unpleasant responsibilities within the group.

**Induction Information**

To join the Ice Walkers, potential members must have a background in skiing, hunting, climbing, and other relevant skills. They also have to be able to get along with existing members. If potential members have all of these qualities, they are allowed into the Ice Walkers. The Ice Walkers have recently decided to have an initiation when a new member joins the group.

To join the Aid Workers, potential members must be certified Emergency Medical Technicians with experience working abroad. They also have to be able to get along with the rest of the group. If potential members have all of these qualities, they are allowed into the Aid Workers. The Aid Workers have recently decided to have an initiation for new members.
To join the Bug Watchers, potential members must have an obvious interest in collecting and studying insects. They also have to be able to get along with existing members. If potential members have all of these qualities, they are allowed into the Bug Watchers. The Bug Watchers have recently decided to have an initiation when a new member joins the group.

To join the Audiophiles, potential members must have a clear interest in high-end audio, as well as demonstrable knowledge of acoustics and electronics. They also have to be able to get along with existing members. If potential members have all of these qualities, they are allowed into the Audiophiles. The Audiophiles have recently decided to have an initiation when a new member joins the group.

**General Questions**

As a member of the [Group Name], you have a say in whether the initiation will have a pleasant component, and if so, how pleasant it will be.

(0) The initiation should not have a pleasant component.

The initiation should have a pleasant component. It should be:

(1) SLIGHTLY pleasant.
(2) MODERATELY pleasant.
(3) VERY pleasant.
(4) EXTREMELY pleasant.

You also have a say in whether the [Group Name] initiation will have a stressful component, and if so, how stressful it will be.

(0) The initiation should not have a stressful component.

The initiation should have a stressful component. It should be:

(1) SLIGHTLY stressful.
(2) MODERATELY stressful.
(3) VERY stressful.
(4) EXTREMELY stressful.

Finally, as a [Group Name] member you have a say in how the group should treat initiates as they undergo the initiation:

(0) Initiates should feel NO pressure to complete the initiation.
(1) Initiates should feel a SMALL amount of pressure to complete the initiation.
(2) Initiates should feel a MODERATE amount of pressure to complete the initiation.
(3) Initiates should feel a LARGE amount of pressure to complete the initiation.

(4) Initiates should feel EXTREME pressure to complete the initiation.

Do you think joining the [Group Name] increases the status of new members outside of the group? If so, how much?

(0) NO increase in status outside the group.

(1) SMALL increase in status outside the group.

(2) MODERATE increase in status outside the group.

(3) LARGE increase in status outside the group.

(4) HUGE increase in status outside the group.

Do you think joining the [Group Name] gives new members a coalition that will protect them outside of group activities? If so, to what degree?

(0) NO protection outside the group.

(1) SMALL amount of protection outside the group.

(2) MODERATE amount of protection outside the group.

(3) LARGE amount of protection outside the group.

(4) HUGE amount of protection outside the group.

Do you think that joining the [Group Name] will improve the [First group-relevant skill/trait\(^2\)] of new members? If so, how much?

(0) NO increase in [skill/trait]

(1) SMALL increase in [skill/trait]

(2) MODERATE increase in [skill/trait]

(3) LARGE increase in [skill/trait]

(4) HUGE increase in [skill trait]

Do you think that joining the [Group Name] will improve the [Second group-relevant skill/trait\(^3\)] of new members? If so, how much?

(0) NO increase in [skill/trait]

\(^2\) Ice Walkers: physical fitness, Aid Workers: understanding of different cultures, Bug Watchers: public speaking skills, Audiophiles: understanding of acoustics

\(^3\) Ice Walkers: arctic survival skills, Aid Workers: emergency medicine skills, Bug Watchers: knowledge of insects, Audiophiles: understanding of electronics
(1) SMALL increase in [skill/trait]
(2) MODERATE increase in [skill/trait]
(3) LARGE increase in [skill/trait]
(4) HUGE increase in [skill trait]
Background information
You have completed the first survey. Before you get started on the second survey, please answer a few questions about your background:

Sex:
(M) Male
(F) Female

Have you ever been a member of a fraternity or sorority?
(Y) Yes
(N) No

Have you ever been a member of an organized athletic team?
(Y) Yes
(N) No

Have you ever been a member of the military or ROTC?
(Y) Yes
(N) No

Exit survey
Do the [First Group Name] remind you of any type of group you are familiar with? If so, what type of group?

If yes, does that type of group typically haze (that is, purposefully abuse) new members?

Do the [Second Group Name] remind you of any type of group you are familiar with? If so, what type of group?

If yes, does that type of group typically haze (that is, purposefully abuse) new members?
Chapter 2: Experiment 2

Background information
Have you ever been a member of a fraternity or sorority?
(Y) Yes
(N) No
Have you ever been a member of an organized athletic team?
(Y) Yes
(N) No
Have you ever been a member of the military or ROTC?
(Y) Yes
(N) No

Group Vignettes
You are in a group called the “Ice Walkers.” You are all deep-snow skiers: specialists in arctic survival skills and high-altitude skiing. Every month, your group goes on an expedition. An Ice Walker expedition requires a helicopter trip to a remote location in the mountains. There, in the freezing wilderness, your life depends on the extent of your survival knowledge and the resourcefulness of your fellow group members. All of your activities require intense cooperation to be successful: you must hunt, climb, and carry vital supplies together.

You are in a group called the “Aid Workers.” You are all Emergency Medical Technicians specializing in international humanitarian work. Every month, your group travels on assignments to provide emergency medical care in war-torn areas. The job of the Aid Worker is profoundly dangerous. You are regularly shot at, and you must run through combat zones where others are fighting. Nonetheless, because you are not soldiers, you do not carry guns. All of your activities depend on the reliability of your fellow group members: you must cooperate to give emergency medical care and keep watch in tense situations.

You are in a group called the “Bug Watchers.” You are all insect enthusiasts: individuals specializing in the study and collection of insects. Every month, your group meets to compare insect collections, organize trips to relevant museums, and discuss articles about insects. Bug Watcher members take turns presenting information on various insect species and commenting on the presentations of fellow members. All of your activities require an excellent knowledge of insects and a willingness to provide constructive criticism.
You are in a group called the “Audiophiles.” You are all music enthusiasts: collectors of high-end audio equipment and CDs. Individually, you spend time customizing your stereo systems to deliver the most pristine and impressive sound. Every month, your group meets to compare stereo equipment, organize trips to stereo conventions, and discuss the current state-of-the-art in stereo products. Members take turns demonstrating their stereo systems for other members and competing to have the best system. All of your activities require a thorough knowledge of audio and electronics.

**Contribution Primes**

*Low:* You participate in the [Group Name] much less than other members. While you are with the group, you enjoy yourself, but you're not as motivated to work as other members. You avoid many [Group Name activity] and only go on those that suit your time schedule. When the group needs extra work to be done, you do not usually volunteer to do it. You have been a member for 3 years.

*High:* You participate in the [Group Name] much more than other members. While you are with the group, you enjoy yourself, and you try to work as hard as possible. You make a point to attend every [Group Name activity], regardless of your other commitments in life. When the group needs extra work to be done, you are often the one who volunteers to do it. You have been a member for 4 months.

**Manipulation checks**

Being a member of a group takes time and energy. Describe your current level of participation in this group:

(0) NO time or energy spent

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10) EXTREME amounts of time and energy spent

---

4 All scales for experiment 2 are 0 – 10, but will hereafter be truncated.
Some groups regularly put themselves in danger, while others are completely safe. Describe how dangerous you think your current level of participation is in this group:

(0) NOT dangerous at all.

…

(10) EXTREMELY dangerous.

Some groups require their members to coordinate their actions and work together closely, while others do not. Describe how coordinated you think this particular group is:

(0) NOT coordinated at all.

…

(10) EXTREMELY coordinated.

**Induction Information**

To join the [Group Name], potential members must prove that they have all the necessary skills: [skills mentioned at the end of each vignette]. They also must show that they can get along with existing members. If potential members can do these things, they are allowed to join the group.

The [Group Name] have recently decided to have an initiation when new members join the group.

**General Questions**

As a member of the [Group Name], you have a say in whether the initiation will have a pleasant component, and if so, how pleasant it will be.

(0) The initiation should NOT have a pleasant component.

…

(10) The initiation should have an EXTREMELY pleasant component.

You also have a say in whether the [Group Name] initiation will have a stressful component, and if so, how stressful it will be.

(0) The initiation should NOT have a stressful component.

…

(10) The initiation should have an EXTREMELY stressful component.

Finally, as a [Group Name] member you have a say in whether the group should pressure new members to complete the initiation, and if so, to what extent.

(0) New members should experience NO pressure to complete the initiation.

…
(10) New members should experience an EXTREME amount of pressure to complete the initiation.

Some groups are respected more than others. Describe how you think outsiders perceive the [Group Name].

(0) Outsiders think the group has extremely LOW status.

…

(10) Outsiders think the group has extremely HIGH status.

Sometimes, just by being a member of a group, people are respected more. Do you think joining the [Group Name] will bring new members more status and respect from outsiders? If so, how much?

(0) Outsiders will show NO additional respect for new members.

…

(10) Outsiders will show HUGE amounts of additional respect for new members.

Sometimes, just by being a member of a group, people are looked at as being better-off than they were alone. In other words, outsiders think that everyone in the group will help each other out if they get into trouble. Do you think outsiders will see new [Group Name] members as having more mutual aid available to them? If so, to what degree?

(0) Outsiders think that new members have NO additional mutual aid.

…

(10) Outsiders think that new members have HUGE amounts of additional mutual aid.

Regardless of what outsiders think, how much do you think new members will actually benefit from any additional mutual aid?

(0) NO benefit from actual mutual aid.

…

(10) HUGE benefit from actual mutual aid.

Do you think that joining the [Group Name] will improve new members' [First Group-Relevant Skill/Trait5]? If so, how much?

(0) NO increase in [First Group-Relevant Skill/Trait].

5 Ice Walkers: arctic survival skills, Aid Workers: emergency medicine skills, Bug Watchers: understanding of insects, Audiophiles: understanding of stereo systems
(10) HUGE increase in [First Group-Relevant Skill/Trait].

Do you think that joining the [Group Name] will improve new members' [Second Group-Relevant Skill/Trait]? If so, how much?

( 0 ) NO increase in [Second Group-Relevant Skill/Trait].

(10) HUGE increase in [Second Group-Relevant Skill/Trait].

**Exit survey**

You’ve read about two groups. Did the FIRST group remind you of any real life groups?

(Y) Yes

(N) No

If you answered yes to the previous question, do these real life groups typically have stressful initiations for new members? If you said “no” to the previous question, select the answer “Not Applicable”.

(Y) Yes

(N) No

(A) Not Applicable

You’ve read about two groups. Did the SECOND group remind you of any real life groups?

(Y) Yes

(N) No

If you answered yes to the previous question, do these real life groups typically have stressful initiations for new members? If you said “no” to the previous question, select the answer “Not Applicable”.

(Y) Yes

(N) No

(A) Not Applicable

---

6 Ice Walkers: physical fitness, Aid Workers: ability to work under pressure, Bug Watchers: public speaking skills, Audiophiles: ability to work with electronics.
Chapter 3

In this study you will read a description of a group while imagining that you are a group member. You will then make a series of decisions about how to act within the group. Your decisions should be based on what you would do if you were actually a member.

**Programming Note: Randomly assign R to one of the two groups, **Ice Walkers** or **Bug Watchers** (50% in each group).**

**Ice Walkers Survey**

You are in an all-[Male/Female] group called the "Ice Walkers." You are deep-snow skiers: specialists in arctic survival and high-altitude skiing. Every month, your group goes on an expedition. An Ice Walker expedition requires a helicopter trip to a remote location in the mountains. There, in the freezing wilderness, your life depends on your survival knowledge and the resourcefulness of your fellow group members. All of your activities require intense cooperation: you must hunt, climb, and carry vital supplies together.

**Programming Note: Randomly select Low or High Contribution condition. Please create a data-only variable indicating which condition was selected.**

**Display for Low Contribution**

You work very little for the Ice Walkers, much less than other members. While you are with the group, you enjoy yourself, but you're not as motivated to help as other members. You avoid many Ice Walker expeditions and only go on those that suit your time schedule. When the group needs extra work to be done, you do not usually volunteer to do it.

**Display for High Contribution**

You work very hard for the Ice Walkers, much more than other members. While you are with the group, you enjoy yourself, and you try to help as much as possible. You make a point to attend every Ice Walker expedition, regardless of your other commitments in life. When the group needs extra work to be done, you are often the one who volunteers to do it.
IW1. Being a member of a group takes time and energy. Describe the cost of your current level of participation in this group:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO time or energy spent</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

[DISPLAY]
To join the Ice Walkers, a potential member must prove that [HE/SHE] has all the necessary skills for arctic survival: skiing, hunting, climbing, etc. [HE/SHE] must also show that he can get along with existing members. If potential members can do these things, they are allowed to join the group.

IW2. Sometimes, just by being a member of a group, people are respected more. Do you think joining the Ice Walkers will bring new members more respect from outsiders? If so, how much?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO additional respect from outsiders</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

[GRID – SP BY ROW]

IW3. Sometimes, just by being a member of a group, people are better off than they were alone. In other words, other group members will watch out for them and help them if they get into any kind of trouble. Do you think new members of the Ice Walkers can count on this sort of group assistance? If so, to what extent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO group assistance when they need help</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

[GRID – SP BY ROW]

IW4. Most people can improve their skills if they work hard. Sometimes people can even improve their skills without working hard, just by hanging around highly-skilled people and listening to them or watching what they do. Over the first few months of membership, do you think new members of the Ice Walkers will be able to improve their arctic survival skills in this way? If so, to what extent?
NO increase in skill from just watching and listening

MODERATE increase in skill from just watching and listening

HUGE increase in skill from just watching and listening

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

[GRID – SP BY ROW]

IW5. After the first few months of membership are over, to what extent do you think new members will be able to further improve their arctic survival skills if they spend several years participating and working hard as a member?

NO increase in skill after several years of work

MODERATE increase in skill after several years of work

HUGE increase in skill after several years of work

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

[DISPLAY]
The Ice Walkers have recently decided to have an initiation when new members join the group.

[GRID – SP BY ROW]

IW6. As a member of the Ice Walkers, you have a say in whether the initiation will have a pleasant component, and if so, how pleasant it will be.

NO pleasant component

MODERATELY pleasant component

EXTREMELY pleasant component

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

[GRID – SP BY ROW]

IW7. You also have a say in whether the Ice Walker initiation will have a stressful component, and if so, how stressful it will be.

NO stressful component

MODERATELY stressful component

EXTREMELY stressful component

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

[GRID – SP BY ROW]
IW8. Finally, as an Ice Walker, you have a say in whether the group should pressure all new members to complete the initiation, and if so, to what extent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO pressure</th>
<th>MODERATE pressure</th>
<th>EXTREME pressure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

[GRID – SP BY ROW]

IW 9. Have you ever been a member of the military, a Greek letter society, or an organized athletic team?

Yes..............................1
No .....................................2

BUG WATCHERS SURVEY

[DISPLAY]
You are in an all-[MALE/FEMALE] group called the "Bug Watchers.” You are insect enthusiasts: individuals specializing in the study and collection of insects. Every month, your group meets to compare insect collections, organize trips to relevant museums, and discuss articles about insects. Bug Watcher members take turns presenting information on various insect species and commenting on the presentations of fellow members. All of your activities require an excellent knowledge of insects and a willingness to provide constructive criticism.

PROGRAMMING NOTE: RANDOMLY SELECT LOW OR HIGH CONTRIBUTION CONDITION. PLEASE CREATE A DATA-ONLY VARIABLE INDICATING WHICH CONDITION WAS SELECTED.

[DISPLAY FOR LOW CONTRIBUTION]
You work very little for the Bug Watchers, much less than other members. While you are with the group, you enjoy yourself, but you're not as motivated to work as other members. You avoid many Bug Watcher group meetings and only go to those that suit your time schedule. When the group needs extra work to be done, you do not usually volunteer to do it.

[DISPLAY FOR HIGH CONTRIBUTION]
You work very hard for the Bug Watchers, much more than other members. While you are with the group, you enjoy yourself, and you try to do as much as possible. You make a point to attend every Bug Watcher meeting, regardless of your other commitments in life. When the group needs extra work to be done, you are often the one who volunteers to do it.

[GRID – SP BY ROW]

BW1. Being a member of a group takes time and energy. Describe the cost of your current level of participation in this group:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO time or energy spent</th>
<th>MODERATE amounts of time and energy spent</th>
<th>HUGE amounts of time and energy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To join the Bug Watchers, a potential member must prove that [HE/SHE] has all the necessary skills to talk about [HIS/HER] appreciation of insects: a background in the study of insects, experience with public speaking, etc. [HE/SHE] must also show that he can get along with existing members. If potential members can do these things, they are allowed to join the group.

**GRID – SP BY ROW**

BW 2. Sometimes, just by being a member of a group, people are respected more. Do you think joining the Bug Watchers will bring new members more respect from outsiders? If so, how much?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO additional respect from outsiders</th>
<th>MODERATE amounts of additional respect from outsiders</th>
<th>HUGE amounts of additional respect from outsiders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**GRID – SP BY ROW**

BW 3. Sometimes, just by being a member of a group, people are better off than they were alone. In other words, other group members will watch out for them and help them if they get into any kind of trouble. Do you think new members of the Bug Watchers can count on this sort of group assistance? If so, to what extent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO group assistance when they need help</th>
<th>MODERATE amounts of group assistance when they need help</th>
<th>HUGE amounts of group assistance when they need help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GRID – SP BY ROW**

BW 4. Most people can improve their skills if they work hard. Sometimes people can even improve their skills without working hard, just by hanging around highly-skilled people and listening to them or watching what they do. Over the first few months of membership, do you think new members of the Bug Watchers will be able to improve their understanding of insects in this way? If so, to what extent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO increase in skill from just watching and listening</th>
<th>MODERATE increase in skill from just watching and listening</th>
<th>HUGE increase in skill from just watching and listening</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BW5. After the first few months of membership are over, to what extent do you think new members will be able to further improve their understanding of insects if they spend several years participating and working hard as a member?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO increase in skill after several years of work</th>
<th>MODERATE increase in skill after several years of work</th>
<th>HUGE increase in skill after several years of work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[DISPLAY]
The Bug Watchers have recently decided to have an initiation when new members join the group.

BW6. As a member of the Bug Watchers, you have a say in whether the initiation will have a pleasant component, and if so, how pleasant it will be.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO pleasant component</th>
<th>MODERATELY pleasant component</th>
<th>EXTREMELY pleasant component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BW7. You also have a say in whether the Bug Watcher initiation will have a stressful component, and if so, how stressful it will be.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO stressful component</th>
<th>MODERATELY stressful component</th>
<th>EXTREMELY stressful component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

BW8. Finally, as a Bug Watcher, you have a say in whether the group should pressure all new members to complete the initiation, and if so, to what extent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO pressure</th>
<th>MODERATE pressure</th>
<th>EXTREME pressure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
SHOW GRP TO ALL RESPONDENTS.

[GRID – SP BY ROW]

GRP. Have you ever been a member of the military, a Greek letter society, or an organized athletic team?

Yes ...................................... 1
No  ....................................... 2

INSERT STANDARD CLOSE.